global capitalism: what’s race got to do with it?

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This article addresses the relationship between nationalist projects of subject making and capitalist political economy. Using the United States as an illustrative case, I suggest that the capitalist project of labor-force creation articulates with nationalist projects in the ethnoracial construction of workers and national subjects. Taking the situations of U.S. Jews and women as my main window, I propose that anthropologists should think of race as a relationship to the means of production and racial constructions of manhood and womanhood as the corporeal embodiments of that relationship.

For the sake of those who came of age too recently to have spent their youth in revolutionary study groups reading all three volumes of Capital, it is worth explaining the roots of current concerns about the relationship of capitalism and race. Marxist predictions, especially about the shelf life of capitalism, have taken a beating at the hand of real world events in the 20th century. Capitalism was supposed to collapse because it has a central contradiction, a sort of tragic flaw, the socioeconomic equivalent of a lethal gene that was supposed to bring capitalism to its inevitable death. The falling rate of profit is supposed to be the somatic manifestation of that contradiction (see Brenner 1998 for a powerful revision of Marx). When profit collapses, the system implodes, and the international working class, which has been leaning on its collective shovel watching the whole process, digs capitalism’s grave and gets on with the business of building socialism. But workers of the world did not unite against capitalism. Instead, such anticapitalist shovel brigades as there were in the fifties, sixties, and seventies were organized along lines of race, ethnicity, and, later, gender and sexuality but not really along class lines.

When these movements weakened in the eighties and nineties, capitalism got stronger, socialism got weaker, began sleeping with the enemy and having capitalist babies, and now look at the fix we are in: Of the world’s 100 largest economies, half are corporations. Walmart is bigger than Greece; Philip Morris is larger than Chile; Chrysler and Nestlé are about the same size as Pakistan and Hungary, respectively. The six largest corporations in the world have revenues greater than the 30 countries containing half of the world’s population. And, if Internet sources are at all reliable, the top 14 corporations in the world together have greater revenues than the U.S. treasury (Sierra Magazine 1998:17).
Capitalism now has a power perhaps greater than ever in its history to cross, even to dissolve, national boundaries. When one focuses on the global migration and circulation of people (Basch et al. 1993), the transition of formerly socialist economies to capitalism (Eyal et al. 1997), or the multinational nature of capitalist production and circulation of commodities, it seems reasonable to argue that capitalism may well erode the nation-state. A look at the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), U.S. efforts toward initiating an African version of NAFTA, the diasporic nature of Chinese capital (Dirlik 1997; Ong 1997; Ong and Nonini 1996), and the apparent softening of national boundaries within the European states of the European Economic Community (EEC) provides ample support for the argument made by David Harvey and others that financial capital is so powerful and mobile that in its drive for a "free" world economy it might seriously diminish the power of nations and of nationalism as preeminent political forces (Basch et al. 1993; Harvey 1989; Hobsbawm 1990; Tilly 1990). The rise of global mass consumer culture also points to an emergence of a "global village," in Marshall McLuhan's phrase (McLuhan and Powers 1989). Since then, cultural studies scholars like Frederic Jameson (1989) have come to think in terms of "postmodern hyperspace," as national and regional styles of dress are superceded by Nikes and Levis and local, participatory forms of entertainment are replaced by a succession of commoditized global forms via TV and MTV, Hollywood and Hong Kong movies, popular music and the Internet.

How then to reconcile this apparent dissolution of national boundaries with the staggering upsurge of racial, ethnic, and religious conflict mainly within nations at precisely the time when capitalism's global hegemony seems most secure? Fundamentalist versions of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism are engaging the passions of people across the class spectrum and shaping struggles over national boundaries, over the meaning of nation and who constitutes its "real" members. The legacies of colonial racial and ethnic politics underlie conflicts across Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Xenophobia and racism are on the rise in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe. And ethnic nationalisms exploded among former socialists just when they embraced the capitalist road.

The number of people who have been uprooted and killed is horrific. In Afghanistan, 6.2 million people have been displaced and over one million killed; in Algeria, 105,000 have been displaced and 80,000–100,000 killed; in Colombia, over one million displaced and between 40,000 and 250,000 killed; India/Kashmir has seen 213,000 uprooted and 30,000–50,000 killed; Iraq, over 1.5 million uprooted and 100,000–250,000 killed; Kosovo, before the NATO bombing, 459,000 uprooted and 2,000 killed; Myanmar, over one million uprooted and 130,000–500,000 killed; Rwanda, 3.5 million uprooted and 500,000–800,000 killed; Sierra Leone, 1.45 million uprooted and 15,000–20,000 killed; Sri Lanka, over 900,000 uprooted and 55,000–70,000 killed; and bloodiest of all, Sudan, with over 4.3 million people uprooted and 1.5 million killed (Wright 1999:A11).

Mainstream journalism and TV news present ethnic scapegoating and violence as a taken-for-granted aspect of human nature. Their spread in the face of apparent widespread governmental, NATO, and U.N. opposition seems only to confirm their strength and, hence, their primordial nature. These explanations mesh with theories that explain social structures as based on human nature, and gender and sexuality based on biology: both capitalism and nationalism are part of the human condition, whether we like it or not (Fukuyama 1992). Today, however, it is situations of inter-ethnic violence that seem most in need of explanation.
Capitalism has always been a global system. But this latest and most intensely global phase seems to be eroding some aspects of state power and nationalism, especially those that impede particular kinds of free trade and those that provide health, education, and welfare to the populace. One could argue, as Mann (1993) does, that states are changing their functions but hardly withering away. Alternatively, one can argue that ethnic violence is a response to the local elites who are too weak to stop the depredations of global finance capital. Verdery (1993), for example, suggests that Eastern European scapegoating of Jews and Gypsies is a response to the economic upheavals caused by a combination of postsocialism and global capitalism (see also Nairn 1993; Stolcke 1996). These two explanations are quite compatible. Capitalism can both change or erode state power and foster the kinds of nationalism and violence that are at once manifestations and causes of state weakness.

Still, a common national culture has been an aspect of modern nation-states that has been historically critical to the development of capitalist political economy (Gellner 1983, 1997). A decade ago, Brackette Williams (1989) argued persuasively that the demand to impose cultural homogeneity on a heterogeneous populace is at the core of the nationalist project. Central to the common culture and homogeneity of nations is the construction of national subjects.

Applying these ideas to today's xenophobic violence, Verdery suggests that "notions of purity and contamination, of blood as a carrier of culture, or of pollution are fundamental to the projects of nation-making" and that the homogeneity insisted on by nationalist projects requires those who do not fit to be "assimilated or eliminated" (1993:42). Meredith Tax argues that these ethnoracial and religious movements share the kind of social purity they seek to create—"a desire for racial, ethnic and religious homogeneity; an apocalyptic vision of purification through bloodshed; and a patriarchal view of women and the family" (1999:24). She argues that these movements are atavistic, or throwbacks, in the sense that they are "invented traditions" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; cf. Anderson 1983) yearning for an imagined golden age when their groups were pure.

Such nationalistic and xenophobic movements are broadly enmeshed in the nationalist project of subject making. The idea that national subjects and colonial subjects have been historically constructed as races (or ethnicities, languages, or religions), classes, and styles of manhood and womanhood is well established (e.g., Kerber et al. 1995; Ong 1996; Stoler 1989; Tamanoi 1998; Williams 1996). There has been a historic isomorphism (or overdetermination or fit) between the ways states construct national subjects and the ways capital organizes production and its labor forces on the basis of gender, race, and ethnicity (recent analyses include Fikes 1998 and Medina 1998). Although nation and capitalism are separate projects, each depends on and shapes the other.

In the remainder of this article, I will use the United States as an illustrative case to develop further my argument that capitalism is causally and systemically linked to the construction of race and racism. I will show that relations to the means of capitalist production in the United States have been organized in ways that are consistent with nationalist constructions of national subjects and internal aliens. The central theoretical point I wish to advance is that race in the United States has historically been a key relationship to the means of capitalist production, and gender constructions are what has made race corporeal, material, and visible. In Marxist thought, relations to the means of production are class relations. To argue that race is a relationship to the means of production is not to reduce race to class. Rather, it is to complicate each term, to argue that race and class are mutually constitutive, two facets of the
same process that apply to both the structure of productive relationships and people's consciousnesses or identities. It is in such socially structured identities that the nationalist and capitalist projects connect.

Current interest in identities—especially the conventional threesome of race, class, and gender—has addressed the cultural content of identities for actors, as well as for the national hegemonic structures that make them meaningful for people to interpret, enact, and embrace. I think it is fair to say that they are dialectical: State policy, law, and popular discourse make race and gender matter for one's life chances; people embrace these categories because they matter, but they do not inhabit them in the ways hegemonic institutions and discourses construct them; popular enactments in turn reshape hegemonic practices.

Class is often the Cinderella in analyses of this threesome with respect to national projects. That is, it is treated as a “lifestyle choice of you and your family,” as Lillian Robinson (1995:8) puts it when criticizing scholars who treat class as if it were a set of cultural choices that are unrelated to economic structures.

But one could also challenge the lack of attention to economics in analyses of race in the same way that Robinson does for class. True, the state, nationalism, and civic discourse have gotten a lot of play on the structural side of race. But the organization of production and the racial division of labor, though well described, are poorly theorized. Thinking theoretically about the ways that race and ethnicity work as a relationship to the means of capitalist production in the United States can help us understand how global capitalism might feed nationalism even as it seems to erode states.

race and gender as capitalism’s relations of production

Treating race (and ethnicity), class, and gender as the mutually constituting political and economic relationships of capitalism is key to this analysis. By mutually constituting I mean, first, that none is primary in the sense of being the irreducible minimum. Second, I mean that cultural perceptions of any one of these dimensions of social being shape the other two. For example, the way a culture classifies a person racially affects its portrayals of that person’s manhood or womanhood.

My entry point for analyzing race as a relationship that structures capitalist production is the situation of Jews in the United States. Jews are one of several ethnic groups whose racial assignment in the last 150 years has gone from white to off-white and back to white. Prior to the mid-19th century, all Europeans in the United States, including Jews, were more or less equally white. The largely Western European stream of Jews who entered the United States prior to the 1880s faced anti-Semitism but not racial unwhitening. Jews ceased to be white with large-scale immigration from Eastern Europe around the turn of the last century, and then they became white again after World War II. These racial changes are linked to American Jews’ changing relationships to the means of capitalist production and to wider discourses and policies of national inclusion.

the racial constitution of class as a relationship to the means of production

If race, class, and gender are mutually constituted, it follows that class is constituted racially as well as in gender-specific ways. We would do well then to start by asking what Jews were doing in a class sense when they became racially nonwhite or, more accurately, off-white. It was their labor, especially the performance of work that was at once important to the economy of the nation and defined as menial and unskilled, that was key to their off-white racial reassignment.
Let us focus on New York City at the turn of the last century, where Eastern European Jewish immigrants and their children made up one-quarter of the population and almost half of the industrial workforce. Their employer par excellence was the garment industry, which was also the city's biggest industry. In 1900, 40 percent of Jewish women and almost 20 percent of the men worked in that industry. Clara Lemlich, a future union organizer, newly arrived in New York in 1903, found garment work right away, "at a fraction of the wage her father would have earned for the same work" (Orleck 1995:25) had he been able to find work. This was a common situation. Most women garment workers were young and unmarried—daughters contributing to their households.

Despite its organization in small shops, the clothing industry was exemplary in its rapid growth and its shift from a craft organization to an intensely industrial organization based on "unskilled" labor. Howe writes, "Measured by number of workers and value of product, [garment industry growth in the 1890s] was two or three times as rapid as the average for all industries. For the women's clothing industry, the years of sharpest growth were during this period, one that coincided with Jewish immigration" (1980:155). Both growth and reorganization took place at the same time that Jews entered the industry. The availability of Jewish immigrant labor made the industry's sharp growth possible and also facilitated the reorganization of labor away from reliance on skilled producers of garments to an assembly line where many workers employed fewer skills to produce a large number of the same garments.

The irony of this situation, as Stephen Steinberg (1989:98–99) has shown, is that Jewish immigrants were a skilled bunch, especially in the garment trades but also as printers, bakers, carpenters, cigar packers, blacksmiths, and building trades workers. Two-thirds of all Jewish adult workers who immigrated between 1899 and 1910 were classed as skilled, a much higher proportion than that among English, Scandinavian, and German immigrants. The availability of very high skill levels among immigrant Jewish garment workers could have sustained greatly expanded craft production, but manufacturers nevertheless reorganized for mass production by de-skilling the jobs and by intensifying the work.

What was it about a Jewish labor force that allowed manufacturers to do this? I suggest that occupational restriction was the critical factor. Jewish workers were frozen out of many occupations in which they were skilled, such as printing and the building trades, and out of jobs that were controlled by unions, like transportation and communications. American Federation of Labor craft unions in these trades played a big role in excluding Jews. These unions were most definitely the province of white male workers—a "privileged labor class" of Irish, British, and Germans—who often met the immigrants of the newer streams with violence. Such practices were apparently highly valued in governmental circles, for, in 1910, the U.S. Immigration Commission congratulated the trade union movement for being among the "bulwarks of Americanism" (Brandes 1976:1; Rischin 1962:231).

Jews went into the garment industry because they could; they had the skills, and those jobs were open to them. They did not become print, transport, or construction workers, not because they lacked the skills but because they were not allowed into the unions that controlled the right to practice them. For those unions, whiteness was an important requisite for membership.

I am arguing that job degradation and racial darkening were linked processes. The immigrants who worked in the garment industry saw their jobs divided and their work de-skilled as the industry grew. The construction industry provides a nice contrast. It also expanded, but its jobs underwent no equivalent de-skilling or division. Indeed,
agreements between employers and trade unions governed the way in which labor was organized as well as who could perform it. The degraded jobs of the nonwhite workforce in the garment industry stand in sharp contrast to the artisan-like conditions that prevailed in the building trades, where white unions, with explicit approval from government and tacit consent or enthusiasm from employers, policed both the conditions of labor and who was allowed to do it. The freedom of craft autonomy in the construction of work was a prerogative of whiteness. It stood in contrast to the servility of the nonwhite and off-white assembly line.

At the end of the 19th century, Jews were part of a vast stream of some 23 million immigrants. This immigration coincided with the American industrial revolution. European immigrants became its factory workers and the bulk of the urban populations in the East and Midwest, while Asian and Mexican immigrants formed the core of Western agribusiness.

European races were visible especially given where Americans worked. Immigrants were visible not least because they were concentrated in urban industrial centers. By 1910, 58 percent of the industrial workforce in 20 of the main mining and manufacturing industries were European immigrants (Steinberg 1989:36). In both the 1910 and 1920 censuses, native-born whites made up slightly less than half of the total labor force and hence an even smaller percentage of the working-class labor force. In 1880, when only 13 percent of the U.S. population were foreign-born, the foreign born made up 42 percent of the workers in manufacturing and mining. In contrast, a staggering 44 percent of all native-born white male workers in 1910 worked in farming, lumbering, and livestock-raising far from the industrial centers (Carpenter 1927:271).

The way the garment industry reorganized with Jewish and Italian immigrant workers was typical of other industries of the period. David Montgomery (1979) notes that a big supply of immigrant workers underlay the rapid expansion of a system where the skills required for industrial jobs came to be embedded in the machinery, the organization of the labor process, and forms of supervision (like piecework) designed to outfox workers' resistance to management's control of productivity. Industrial capitalism was not a system of scientific management, but rather one that treated workers as casual and easily replaced factors of production. The captains of industry put their energy into intense supervision and into piecework schemes to increase workers' output. For example, Goodyear Rubber had one inspector for every ten workers. The same pattern prevailed in the oil, chemical, and rubber industries, where two-thirds to three-quarters of the workers were European immigrants, as well as in steel, meatpacking, and textiles, also with large immigrant work forces. In the very organization of industrial work, employers seem to have constructed workers as more instrument or "hand" than fully human, more thing-like than citizen-like. Under the intense gaze of foremen, the work was broken down into simple, repetitive tasks that appeared to justify wages so low that households typically depended upon the wages of more than one earner. Driven labor became a "natural" way to organize mass production, a function of responding to competition and to demand on the one hand, and to reliance on "inferior" workers on the other. In turn, degraded forms of work confirmed the apparent racial inferiority of the workers who performed them.

Only when these immigrants took their places as the masses of unskilled and residentially ghettoized industrial workers, around 1900, did Americans come to believe that Europe was made up of a variety of inferior and superior races. At that point, those who formed the mass of immigrant industrial workers found that they were being classified as members of specific and inferior European races, and for almost half a
global capitalism

century, they were treated as racially not quite white by American law, social prac-
tice, and civic discourses. In California, where they worked in less industrial condi-
tions, southern and eastern Europeans continued to be whiter than they were in the
east (Brundage 1994:21-23; diLeonardo 1984:153-156). Nationality- or ethnic-spe-
cific job niches complemented residentially segregated ethnic communities, making
European races seem real.

State projects also contributed to race making, as Omi and Winant (1994) and
Haney Lopez (1996) have argued so persuasively. Thus, the U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus (1930:25-26) in the early 1900s carved out a special, not-quite-white niche for ra-
cial Europeans. They were not part of "Negroes and other races," but neither were
they the same as "native" whites. It created a set of off-white categories not only by
distinguishing immigrants from "native" whites by country, but also native whites of
native white parentage and native whites of immigrant (or mixed) parentage, that is,
children of immigrants.

The changing racial categorizations of Mexicans in California illustrate the recip-
rocally defining interdependence of race and class and the contribution of state poli-
cies to race making. When California became a state, the race of the indigenous in-
habitants was an important issue of state policy: the new Anglo rulers fit them into the
extant American system of racial classification as red (noncitizen, no rights), white
(citizen with rights) or black (nonperson, private property). Spanish speakers were ini-
tially classified as white by virtue of the class standing of the Mexican landowning
elite. The California constitution enfranchised "White male citizens of the United
States and every White male citizen of Mexico, who shall have elected to become a
citizen of the United States" (Almaguer 1994:56). California courts, however, often
classified working-class Mexicans as Indians. In white supremacist California, Indians
could not be citizens and had no rights whatsoever. They were subject to the 1855
Vagrancy Act, which mandated fines, jail, or enforced labor service on such Mexican
individuals found guilty of vagrancy.

Racial stigmatization of working-class Mexicans, sporadic in California's early
decades of statehood, increased as Mexican men and women became the main labor
force for an emerging agribusiness sector that developed after 1880 (Almaguer
1994:57). By 1930, racial stigmatization of Mexicans underlay the U.S. Census pre-
sumption that Mexicans were to be classified as nonwhite unless a particular individ-
ual was known to the enumerator to be white.³

At the turn of the last century then, the U.S. labor force was marked by broad pat-
terns of occupational segregation based on race. Not-quite-white southern and east-
ern European immigrants produced the industrial wealth of the United States largely
in factories of the east and midwest. In the west and in Hawaii, agribusiness grew rap-
idly, dependent on labor forces made up of Asian immigrants and resident and in-mi-
grating Mexicans. In the southeast, the post-Reconstruction white plantocracy contin-
ued to hold its African American agricultural labor force in various forms of debt
peonage. The labor force of U.S. agribusiness has been no less racially segregated
than that of industry.

That bondage of Africans was the template for an enduring organization of capi-
talism in which race was the basis for the organization of work and that degraded,
driven gang labor made no distinction on the basis of gender are well-developed ar-
guments in African diaspora scholarship (Bennett 1970; DuBois 1935; Fields 1982,
1990; Smedley 1993; Williams 1966). This work organization began in the New
World's first agrarian—and staggeringly profitable—industries based on unfree labor.
There, the willing participation of workers on the white side of the then-new racial
divide was critical to the success of the project. Recent scholarship on labor history has documented the persistence of many varieties of working-class whiteness and racism, even amidst efforts at interracial unionism (Honey 1993; Ignatiev 1995; Letwin 1998; Roediger 1991; Saxton 1990).

**Race in the making of national belonging**

Race making has been a historically important state project, although this is not to say that races and the ways they have been “made” have been consistent. Examples of race-making laws include the entire edifice of Jim Crow, early colonial anti-miscegenation laws, laws denying citizenship to Native Americans, and the 1790 law allowing naturalization only to whites (Haney Lopez 1996). Such laws have contributed to establishing who is and is not a member of the nation of the United States at any given time. Although who is included among whites and Americans has had some historical fluidity, public policy and civic discourse have continued to construct African Americans as the template for nonwhiteness. Sometimes state race-making policies have dovetailed with capitalist projects of organizing relationships to the means of production racially. Sometimes the racial formations of state projects have been at cross-purposes or otherwise inconsistent with those of capitalist projects. The persistence of de jure and de facto discrimination against upper-middle-class African Americans has recently been made visible by protests against “driving while black,” by Danny Glover’s suit against New York City cabbies’ refusal to pick up African Americans, and by protests against racial profiling by police forces across the country. Sometimes racial projects are more immediate and contested than at other times. Nevertheless, capital’s project and the state’s project both address race in an ongoing way. The process is best captured by Omi and Winant’s (1994) notion of “racial formation.” They see racial formation as a continual outcome of political and economic practices that shape and are in turn shaped by racial meanings. They argue further that the state has participated in making races through a series of historically specific racial projects.

A new racial project has been developing since the implementation of the 1965 immigration law and new patterns of immigration. The ethnoracial map of the United States has been reconfigured once again as new immigrants have become the backbone of the growth sectors of the working class, and—along with white women—a secondary track in many key professional and technical occupations ranging from computers and engineering to nursing and medicine (Choy 1998; Ong and Liu 1994; Ong et al. 1994; Park 1997; Parrenas in press; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). Although the nature of jobs and the racial composition of the labor force have changed along with the industries in the economic core, the mass of the working-class labor force is still (or more accurately, once again) not quite white, racially segregated, and occupationally segmented. In the last two decades, Central American and Asian men and women have become concentrated in rapidly growing personal-service industries like hotels and restaurants, health care and cleaning, and the manufacture and processing of food, clothing, and increasingly shelter (in the form of nonunion construction). All of these industries have been reorganized around “unskilled” labor on a minimum wage and temporary basis, and along Taylorist lines. Many new immigrants with professional backgrounds found jobs initially in a secondary sector of their professions. In the late sixties, for example, foreign-trained doctors and nurses worked in public hospitals while their U.S.-trained counterparts took better jobs in the private sector (Choy 1998). Some professionals were unable to work in their fields and adapted by becoming small urban entrepreneurs or, especially among women, ordinary
factory workers (Park 1997; Sanjek 1998). For example, in northern California in the 1980s and early 1990s, mainland Chinese women medical doctors were working in child care centers as teachers or teachers’ aides (Carollee Howes, personal communication).

Soon after the reopening of immigration in 1965, a Federal Interagency Committee was formed to create for the Bureau of the Census a classification of race and ethnicity reflective of the nation’s new immigration and attentive to the progress of affirmative action. The result was the now-familiar four racial groups: American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian/Pacific Islander, black, and white. The committee decided that the fifth group, Hispanic, was an ethnic group but not a race. The governmentese term Hispanic emphasizes the Euro-origins of Spanish speakers from many nations. These “Hispanics” are not exactly white, which they were in the 1960 census. Rather they are modified, not-quite whites, as in Hispanic whites (Wright 1994: 50–51).

In sum, although race was initially invented to justify a brutal regime of slave labor that was profitable to Southern planters, race making has become a key process by which the United States continues to organize and understand labor and national belonging. Africans, Europeans, Mexicans, and Asians each came to be treated as members of less civilized, less moral, less self-restrained races only when they were recruited to be the core of the U.S. capitalist labor force. Such race making depended and continues to rest upon occupational and residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1993). Race making in turn facilitated the degradation of work itself, its organization as “unskilled,” intensely driven, mass-production work. Race making is class making, just as much as class making is race making. They are two views of the same thing.

gender as the embodiment of race and class

Fifteen years ago, Evelyn Nakano Glenn (1985) argued that the United States has consistently defined women of color as workers for the capitalist sector and explicitly not as mothers. Since that time, a considerable body of work has demonstrated both of those points (Collins 1990; Coontz 1992; Glenn 1994; Gordon 1994; Mink 1995; Solinger 1992). Historically, women of ethnорacial groups that have been defined as nonwhite have worked for wages in significantly greater rates than white women. This includes Jewish and other European immigrant women who worked in factories, in other people’s homes (as domestic servants), and in their own homes (doing piecework), and Asian and Mexican women who worked in agriculture as well. For the most part, these women worked side by side with men.

By contrast, until the 1970s, white women worked in much smaller numbers, and when they did, they did so in protected all-white, all-female occupational niches, like clerical and sales work, the “women’s professions,” or in intensely paternalistic milieus marked as “family,” for example, in Southern textile mill villages (Hall et al. 1987) or early boarding houses for women workers in New England mill towns (Dublin 1979). Indeed, such segregation has been a key marker of respectability of women workers and their whiteness. By the same token, unauthorized contact with men has marked women as disreputable. Race-based differential treatment of women and men has also been characteristic of the nationalist project. Thus, benefits the state has historically extended to women because the state manifests an interest in protecting the mothers of future Americans have not been extended equally—or at all—to non- or off-white women. For example, the agricultural, homework, and private household waged jobs where nonwhite women were concentrated were all excluded from coverage by
protective labor legislation, Social Security, unemployment compensation, and minimum wage legislation (Boris and Bardaglio 1991; Kessler-Harris 1995; Rose 1994). Likewise, Mother’s Pensions, antecedents of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), excluded African American women and excluded or gave conditional or limited benefits to women of other nonwhite colors (Ladd-Taylor 1994). Although these women were not numbered among the mothers of the nation or among the nation’s respectable women, there have been consistent differences between the treatment accorded to African American women and that accorded to women of other non- and off-white colors. Public welfare discourses and practices have most consistently stigmatized African American women as unfit mothers, but have constructed Euro-ethnic women and sometimes Mexican- and Asian-ancestry women as redeemable, as conditionally worthy of motherhood if they attempt to emulate ideals of middle-class white domesticity (Coontz 1992; Gordon 1994; Ladd-Taylor 1994; Naples 1997; Petchesky 1985).

The belief that different races have different kinds of gender puts flesh on the American idea of race. To think of gender as the corporeal form, the embodiment of race helps one grasp consistent themes in a large body of feminist literature that seeks to understand the interrelations of race, gender, and nationalism (see Mohanty et al. 1991; Williams 1996). An important set of popular and scientific discourses attended to by this literature is the variety of ways that nonwhite and off-white women and men are represented, namely as beings who lack the manly and feminine temperaments that were requisites for full membership in the body politic and social. Such discourses resonated with discourses of labor that made those who performed degraded labor into degraded beings. In these discourses, nonwhite women workers were stigmatized alongside nonwhite men.

Civic and scientific discourses about race and labor were both supported by a discourse that understood gender as racially bifurcated, one kind of gendering for whites and another for nonwhites. This discourse was first elaborated in defense of slavery and in social Darwinism. Gail Bederman points out that “even state constitutions outside the South explicitly placed African American men in the same category as women, as ‘dependents.’ Negro males, whether free or slave, were forbidden to exercise ‘manhood’ rights— forbidden to vote, hold electoral office, serve on juries, or join the military” (1995:20).

African American women since Sojourner Truth and Harriet Jacobs have been saying that femininity and “true womanhood” are privileges of white women only (Brody 1996:154; see also Brown 1996; Crenshaw and Morrison 1992; Higgenbotham 1992). As Leith Mullings has argued, “stereotypes of African American women revolve around an underlying theme of defeminization—the African American woman as being without a clearly ascribed gender identity, that is, as being unfeminine in the sense of not possessing those traits, alleged to be biological, that defined, constrained, but also protected women of the time” (1997:111). The gender stereotypes of black women and men emphasized similarities between them, such that African American women were portrayed “as the antithesis of the American conception of beauty, femininity and womanhood,” possessing “physical attributes and emotional qualities traditionally attributed to males,” like hypersexuality, strength, and aggressiveness (Jewell 1993:36).

Just as scientific and popular discourses did not construct African American women as women, so too they refused manhood to African American men. A corresponding set of racist stereotypes showed black men as “weak and henpecked, dominated by their robust and overbearing wives” (Bederman 1995:28). Indeed, there was
a positive phobia in white speech, even at the turn of the century, on combining terms for African American or American Indian with terms for manhood. The common linguistic pairing, Bederman tells us, was "the Negro" or "the Indian" and "the white man" (1995:50).

Social Darwinist constructions of savagery and civilization developed the same theme. Gender-blurred, amoral "savages" were stock figures, foils to civilized ladies and gentlemen in early evolutionary schemes. For Herbert Spencer (1910:611–631, 715–743), savage men and women were equally amoral and brutish, but each sex had its own form of barbaric temperament based on relative strength. Men ruled women only because they were stronger. Spencer arranged his information about non-Western societies into a linear historical narrative that ended with Victorian civilization's chivalrous patriarchy and feminine domesticity. The idea was that biological and temperamental differences between men and women developed only with the evolution of "civilized" races. "Savages" (nonwhites) made no distinctions between men and women, and even white women, though they were ideally suited to be mothers of citizens, were themselves not yet evolved enough for citizenship (Spencer 1884:374–375; see also Sacks 1978:18–20, 26–32).

Stereotypes invented in service of slavery and imperialism were rediscovered, modified, and recycled to support dominating new groups of proletarians. Thus, Asian and Jewish men came to be stereotyped as effeminate, more like "their" women than white men, when they joined the bottom of the labor force, while African American, Irish, and Polish women were labeled masculine and hypersexual, again, more like "their" men than like white women. These constructions work dialectically, and in quite complex ways (Bederman 1995 for the U.S.; Carby 1987; Jewell 1993; Mullings 1997:109–127; for postcolonial analyses see Mohanty et al. 1991 and Stoler 1989).

A wide spectrum of nationalist cultural constructions ranging from xenophobic to somewhat progressive but nevertheless paternalistic incorporate notions of fully virtuous mothers as white, and of nonwhite and off-white women as unfit or conditionally fit mothers (whose best possible redemption lay through work); of chivalrous citizens as white men; and alien or criminal "hands" as men and women of color. Such constructions have rested on associations of female virtue with heterosexual domesticity on a man. Beliefs about who is entitled to such patriarchal domesticity, a family wage, and motherhood have been heavily racial in American history. And in turn, such beliefs have permeated the civic discourses that effectively shape the laws and policies governing employment, immigration, and public health and welfare (Domínguez 1986).

In these examples, nationalist projects have resonated and become integrated with the capitalist project (although the two are rarely in synchrony) in the notion that the American populace consists of two mutually exclusive kinds of people who are defined by mutually exclusive ways of being women and men. White ladies and gentlemen (mothers of the nation and thinking citizens) are taken-for-granted national subjects, as if they were the real Americans. Nonwhite peoples (constructed as savage "hands," male and female workers) are aliens within—dangerous perhaps, sometimes conditionally entitled, sometimes "pitted but not entitled" (Gordon 1994). Economically, both capitalism and a white middle-class "we" have depended upon a nonwhite working-class "they." Politically and ideologically, the American "we" has been constructed by contrast to an internal and un-American "they." That said, society is full of exceptions, for example, women in management and the professions, a significant African American middle class, and African American presence in political
office. This doesn’t mean that gender is waning or that successful African Americans are becoming white. It’s more realistic to see these patterns as hard won but embattled gains of earlier massive social movements.

race, capitalism, and nationalism

I have discussed American racial formation to illustrate two suggestions: (1) that anthropologists should consider race and gender as constituting capitalism’s class relations of production; and (2) that the gendered race making that is key for the reproduction of those relations of production is also produced by state policy, civic discourse, and state-sanctioned nationalism. The United States—like many other nations as Brackette Williams (1989, 1996) argues—has defined itself as a nation as much by a contrast between a resident “us” and resident “Others,” as by contrast with those of other nations.

Taken together, both points contribute to current efforts (Basch et al. 1993; Ong and Nonini 1996) to understand the linkages between capitalism (through its project of creating and re-creating appropriate working classes), nationalism, and nation-states in the contemporary world. We need to explain the current and persistent salience or reproduction of race, ethnicity, and religion as organizers of labor and political belonging. Although race is the master constituent for organizing labor and national belonging in the United States, it need not be so elsewhere (Stolcke 1996), where ethnicity, religion, or other forms of “cultural fundamentalism” may function in similar ways. Can we show that current waves of xenophobic violence are demonstrable and proximate outcomes of state policies and capitalist practices that make race, religion, or ethnicity matter greatly for economic, social, cultural, and national entitlement? Can we show this for contemporary nation-state projects and for capitalist labor force projects, singly and in their interactions?

One necessary line of research would explore whether nationalism necessarily produces despised others, and whether capitalism necessarily produces its workers as ethnoracially or religiously stigmatized others. For example, Germany has recently shifted away from citizenship-by-blood, allowing certain long-term immigrants and their children to become naturalized German citizens. Kesha Fikes (1998:14–15) suggests that Portugal’s participation in the European Union has not led to a decline in the salience of race, but rather to a shift in racial constructions. As to whether ethnoracial or religious others have been structurally necessary to capitalist relations of production, we might revisit Robinson’s (1983) challenge to the notion that European nations had “all white” industrial labor forces prior to the postcolonial immigrations of the sixties. Or we might revisit the nationalist dimensions of socialist states to ask about the salience of ethnicity in national policy and to ask what if any role ethnicity played in organizing socialist relations of production and patterns of residential and bureaucratic segregation (Verdery 1996:84–97). Answers may help us to better understand the sharp rise in ethnic violence in so many of the former socialist countries. How did ethnoreligious loyalties persist or become so salient for 70 years in a system that was supposed to end them?

Another line of research would interrogate apparent synchronicities between nationalist and capitalist projects. The 19th-century idea of ethnically homogeneous European nation-states, together with European colonial and imperialist expansion, seem to have helped globalize systems where race, class, and national belonging define one another, where working classes have been constructed as alien others. Post–World War II anticolonial movements—India and Pakistan come immediately to mind—were also nationalist movements, founding states that struggled around
creating homogeneous national subjects. Some of those nations became solidly capitalist, some sought various kinds of socialism, and some pursued "third" ways. Did such national projects continue to organize each of these different organizations of production?

Capitalism has developed newer global power centers beyond western Europe, the United States, and Japan. In Asia, China and Chinese diaspora capitalisms (Dirlik 1997; Ong and Nonini 1996) have joined Japan and Korea as major players. They certainly operate globally within national contexts shaped by European ethnoracial patterns and make use of existing races from the cartography of colonialism to organize overseas labor forces. But it would be interesting to explore the organizations of capitalist labor. Can one have, as Eyal et al. (1997) argue for parts of Eastern Europe, capitalism without capitalists? Do any of these capitalisms create their own domestic, ethnoracial others within? Gender is an important principle for organizing labor in Taiwan (Hsiung 1996) and Japan (Kondo 1990; Tamanoi 1998), but do different varieties of womanhood and manhood map onto discourses of something class-like or ethnoc-like in these countries?

It will also be important to analyze the contradictoriness within and between nationalist and capitalist projects lest we anthropologists fall into the trap of neofunctionalism. Thus, the argument I advance in this article accords with Tom Nairn's (1993:158) suggestion that Balkanization with its attendant ethnocide, xenophobia, racism, and religious fundamentalisms is integral to the progress of capitalism itself. Pursuing this line of research about the capitalist-nationalist nexus suggests that nationalist projects may find themselves between a rock and a hard place: If imposing ethnic homogeneity on a heterogeneous populace is part of making working classes and building nations, its consequences are nevertheless difficult to control, and the ensuing violence can be bad for business. Should violence and Balkanization be understood as the labor and birth pains of new varieties of national subjects and stigmatized hands?

There is also no shortage of contradictoriness within the capitalist projects as to how they relate to nationalist projects. For example, particular industries or blocks of capital may find themselves in conflict with other blocks of capital over particular state policies. The arms industry and the tourist industries are among the world's largest industries. The former is a government-mediated business in that governments and public police forces are the major purchasers of weaponry. It is an industry that benefits from particular kinds of warfare. The tourist industry depends upon the discretionary travel of individuals. Although a particular kind of commoditized nationalism and cultural authenticity are good for tourism globally (Enloe 1989), nationalist wars are a growing threat to the international tourist industry, which served some 200 million people annually by the mid-eighties, and by 2000 will have become the world's biggest industry (Enloe 1989:20).

Capital's global expansion and erosion of national borders seem to coexist uneasily with nationalism. As the recent meetings of the WTO showed, powerful transnational corporations in concert with powerful states push against national borders for freer movement of their capital and commodities. But other powerful capitals and states also erect specific barriers against the capital and commodities of competitors. Likewise, weak national capitals may encourage borders, even as their comprador elites may open them. Public protests by and on behalf of the world's "have-nots" challenged the legitimacy of all those capitalist and national players as against the interests of the vast majority of the world's populace. It is important to note that the most powerful efforts to make national borders permeable, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), for example, apply to the movement of capital. With few exceptions, states have surrendered no power—nor has capital asked them to—to govern the movements of working people. Indeed, the creation of stigmatized, nation-based racial others through immigration and citizenship laws, among other state practices, has stimulated the rise of cottage industries and mafia-like enterprises to help undocumented people keep up with capital's global shifts in production (Randall 1999).

Nationalism and nation-state-making projects seem to coexist with a contradictory set of trends toward the weakening of states and of nationalism. For example, this latest and most intensely global phase of capitalism seems to be eroding some aspects of state power and nationalism, specifically those that impede particular kinds of free trade, and those that provide health, education, and welfare to the populace. The Reagan-Thatcher "revolution" of the 1980s, which drastically cut public nonarms spending, has gone global. Helped by the imposition of World Bank policies, laws favoring "free market" national policies have become the norm for many of the world's nation-states. Yet, other aspects of nation-states, notably armies and police, have become even more important. Michael Mann (1993) argues that what looks like a withering away of the state within and beyond Europe is really a shift in the functions it performs and the powers it exercises in relation to changes in the nature of capitalism. The integration of the European Union (EU), in developing a common currency, allowing the free movement of capital and people presents another example. Is the existence of the EU a sign that capitalism can overcome nationalism and its ethnoracial divisiveness? Or are the new migration policies of the EU instead reinscribing old dichotomies from colonial days—between European whites and nonwhite ex-colonials—and a new form of supernationalism in which whites of postcolonial nations become the measure of Europeanness?

Finally, what do we make of the very real global shift toward capitalism's dependence on women's waged (as well as its continued dependence on their unwaged) labor? In virtually every region of the world, women across the spectrum of ethnicity, nation, and religion have been incorporated into the waged labor force so that today women make up significant portions of the labor forces across the globe (Sivard 1985:11–17). How do we understand the rise of waged labor, not only among poor and working-class women, but also among those of more affluent classes? Do these patterns work for or against fundamentalist and nationalist race-making projects and capitalism's race-based patterns of exploitation?

To return to the beginning of my remarks, Marx believed that capitalism would collapse of its own contradictions, in an economic meltdown. Instead in 1999, we have what looks like global capitalism triumphant. Yet there are signs of trouble, the most obvious and heartbreaking of which is a proliferation of nationalist implosions. Without a democratic alternative, it is not a pretty picture. Yet I do not think Marx had it all wrong. I am suggesting that Western capitalism has organized its relations of production racially and by gender. It has pursued political and economic policies that make nations at once multiracial and racist (or otherwise xenophobic). These trajectories have their own contradictions, manifest in organized nationalist and fundamentalist intranationalist violence in all parts of the globe. I suggest that alternatives and challenges to this state of affairs will need to take on directly the racist economic and political practices and their gendered embodiments that are critical to capitalism and to nationalism. To do that, we need to understand them better than we now do.
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1. See also dehai news/ johnr@adweb.net Subj: Distribution of world’s wealth, accessed April 8, 1999.

2. The material on race as a relation of production is drawn from Brodkin 1998:53–76.

3. By 1940, however, Mexicans were again presumed to be white (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1940). See Foley 1996 for efforts of the League of United Latin American Citizens to litigate for Mexican Americans’ civil rights in Texas between 1920 and 1960, on the basis that Mexicans were white.

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