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# AIR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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AIR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

No. 100 - 10 - 79,82

AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Air Intelligence Division Study No. 10 (AC/AS-2 - O.N.I.) 22 April 1946

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Assistant Chief of Air Staff - 2
Headquarters Army Air Forces
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# AN AJALYSIS OF STRATEGIC COJECTIVES

# IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

#### 1. PROBLEM:

- a. To prepare an analysis of the United States and Canada showing objectives of strategic importance and the accessibility States.
  - b. The analysis will concern the present, 1948, and 1952.

### 2. ASSUMPTIONS:

- a. Russia, with or without Allies, will be the hostile power.
- b. The atomic bomb will not be available to the U.S.S.R. now, nor in 1948; but it will be available in 1952.
- c. Russia will possess bomber aircraft capable of 3,000 mile range in 1946; 4,000 miles in 1948; and 5,000 miles in
- d. Uelen, Siberia, and Spitzbergen in the Evalbard Islands will be the nearest Russian heavy bomber bases.

#### 3. <u>DISCUSSION</u>:

A summary of the strategic objectives in the U.S. and Canada with map showing accessibility of areas is contained in Inclosure 1. Inclosure 2 contains a detailed analysis of the Major objectives to be found in the important areas of the U.S. Inclosure 3 contains a detailed analysis of the major objectives to be found in the important areas of Canada.

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. In 1946 the uranium ore mines in northern Canada, the plutonium plant at Pasco, Washington; Puget Sound area; Winnipeg; Manitoba; San Francisco; Los Angeles are strategically the most vital targets within range.
- b. In 1948 all of Canada and of the United States except Florida and parts of Alabama and Georgia will be within range. In addition to the targets in paragraph 4.a. above this will make vulnerable the highly industrial north Atlantic industries centering about Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Beltimore, and Norfolk as well as the Great Lakes area from Pittsburgh thru Detroit and Chicago to Duluth which constitute the major industrial concentrations of the U.S.

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c. In 1952 with Russian possession of atomic bombs urban or industrial areas would be more logical targets than pure or industrial areas with a 5,000 mile range all of the United industrial systems. With the most likely targets for States and Canada is vulnerable. The most likely targets for States and Canada is vuinerately.

1952 would be atom bomb plants, New York, Mashington, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Akron, Duluth, Puget Sound area, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.

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## UNITED STATES & CANADA

#### PROBLEM

1. The problem is to prepare an analysis of the
United States and Canada showing objectives of strategic
importance and the accessibility of such objectives
to attack by force hostile to the United States.

ASSUMPTIONS

- 1. The periods covered are: (1) current; (2) 1948; (3) 1952.
- 2. In consideration of forces hostile to the United
  States, the status of the British Empire will remain friendly
  throughout the periods under consideration.
- 3. The atomic bomb will be unavailable to the USSR now or in 1948, but will be available in 1952.
- 4. At present USSR has the capability of one-way flights to include points 3,000 miles from Uelen and Svalbard Island; in 1948 4,000 miles, in 1952 5,000 miles.
  - 5. USSR will be the hostile power.
- 6. It is further assumed that current major industrial facilities, including high octane gasoline, synthetic rubber, rocket and jet fuels, will not be dismantled before 1952; that current stocks of airplanes and engines, merchant shipping and munitions will be maintained; and that the current severe shortages of certain critical raw materials will not exist after 1947.

1. The most important objectives are grouped CONCLUSIONS:

into two major regions: Region I - The North Atlantic Coastal Plain Region II - Great Lakes and Ohio River Valley

2. Each of these two regions can be divided into areas, industrial and urban: (See Inclosure No. 1)

## REGION I

This region extends from Halifax on the North to Norfolk on the South, and from the Atlantic Ocean on the East to the Appalachians on the West.

It comprises the following major industrial Lister of the School of the Special School and urban areas:

- (1) Halifax, distributed the dead observed the
  - (2) Portland (Me.) Bath Bath Standard China the Control of
- (3) Boston complex services and the service an
- (4) Providence Fall River Pawtucket
  - (5) Hartford E. Hartford Springfield
- (6) New London Groton (7) Bridgeport - New Haven - Waterbury
- (8) Greater New York Brooklyn Jorsey City
- Paterson Paterson Elizabeth Passaic
- (10) Philadelphia Camden Trenton Chester-Wilmington (Del.)

  - (11) Allentown Bethlehem Easton (12) Scranton - Wilkesbarre - Hazleton

- (13) Baltimore Sparrows Point
- (14) Washington
- (15) Norfolk Newport News Portsmouth

# II GREAT LAKES AND OHIO RIVER VALLEY

- (1) Detroit Windsor River Rouge Pontiac
- (2) Toledo
- (3) Cleveland Akron Lorain Ashtabula
- (4) Youngstown Niles Wafren Sharon Newcastle
- (5) Pittsburg McKeesport Carnegie Clairton Uniontown
- (6) Erie
- (7) Buffalo Niagara Falls Tonawanda Hamilton (Welland Canal)
- (8) Huntington Ashland Ironton Portsmouth (0)
- (9) Cincinnati Covington Newport (Ky) Hamilton Middletown
- (10) Dayton Springfield (0)
- (11) Columbus
- (12) Indianapolis
- (13) Louisville Evansville
- (14) Chicago Gary Hammond Joliet
- (15) St. Louis E. St. Louis
- (16) Minneapolis St. Paul
- (17) Milwaukee
- (18) Duluth Superior
- (19) Kansas City (Mo.) (Kan.)

In addition to these two major regions, there are five isolated areas on the Pacific Coast and two on the Gulf Coast which have considerable strategic importance:

- (1) Vancouver (Can.) Seattle Tacoma-Bremerton
- (2) Portland (Ore.) @ Vancouver (Wash.)
- (3) San Francisco Oakland Berkeley
- (4) Los Angeles Long Beach San Pedro
- (5) San Diego
- (6) New Orleans Baton Rouge Gulfport
- (7) Houston Galweston Beaumont -Port Arthur

# 3. If the attack were made as of the present date. involving a 3,000 mile one-way flight, only lest Coast targets could be hit. (A-Bomb not available)

These consist primarily of

- (a) Airframe Plant (About 10% of the gross total capacity)
- (b) Merchant shipbuilding (about 12% of the gross total capacity)
- (c) Naval bases and yards (about 40% of the gross total Capacity)
- (d) Oil, aviation gasoline and synthetic rubber (about 15% of the gross total capacity)
- (o) Pasco A-Bomb site

For the first four of these categories there exist large supplies on hand adequate to cushion any shock, and ample facilities in other parts of the country out of range.

4. If the attack be made in 1948, assuming a 4,000 mile radius: (A-Bomb not available)

By this time most of the aircraft equipment now on hand would be obsolescent; attacks would logically then be made on this indu stry, through:

- (a) Aircraft engine plants, including jet propulsion and V-Bomb.
- (b) Shiphuilding and shipping concentrations or pools of combat vessels in reserve.
- (c) Petroleum Products, gasoline, oils and major synthetic rubber plants.
- (d) A-bomb sites at Pasco, Oak Ridge and Los Alamos.
  - (e) Selected individual objectives such as:
    - (1) General Electric Co. Plants
      - (2) Westinghouse Electric Co. plants
      - (3) Sperry
      - (4) Gleason
      - (5) Allis Chalmers
      - (6) General Motors Co. plants
      - (7) Ford Motor Co. plants

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- (8) Chrysler
- (9) Wright Field laboratories
- f. Area attack (HE bombs) on following city

arnas:

- (1) Detroit
  - (2) Pittsburgh
- (3) New York
  - (4) Washington

5. In 1952, the possession of the atomic bomb by the USSR would permit the blanket bombing of entire urban or industrial areas. This would increase the objective target value of cities such as Washington and Ottawa whose present significance is largely political and administrative. Under such offensive operations, a determining factor in the enemy's target selection would probably be population and industrial densities rather than specific production facilities. Nearly all of the urban areas and city complexes listed under 2. above would constitute probable objectives for these attacks, with priority to the following:

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# (1) A-Bomb Use

- (a) Steel areas Pittsburg Youngstown Chicago Cleveland
- (b) Washington (Administrative)
- (c) Akron (Rubber products)

- (d) Detroit area (Engines and motor vehicles)
- (e) Duluth-Superior-Soo Canal (Ore shipments)
- (f) New York City (Commerical shipping, population concentration)
- (g) Houston (Oil refining and shipping)
- (h) A-Bomb plants (Special individual targets)
  Installations at the uranium mines in Northern Canada are within a two-way range from Uelen; the flutonium plant at Pasco, Wash. and the ore-treating plant at Port Hope, Ont. are within one-way range. An attack on these may be expected.

(Above not arranged in order of priority)

(2) HE bombs: Same as for 1948.

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- 6. Under the assumption of a current day air attack from USSR involving a range of 3,000 miles from Svalbard or from Uelen, bomb damage, to the United States and Canada would be almost nil, being limited to the four Pacific Coast industrial and urban areas of Seattle, Portland, San Francisco and (barely) Los Angeles.
- 7. Under the assumption of a 1948 air attack from USSR involving a range of 4,000 miles from Svalbard or from Uelen, bomb damage to the United States and Canada would be important in that almost the whole country would be within range, but a single one-way raid even in great force, would not accomplish decisive damage to any one important segment of production in the United States alone.
- 8. Under the assumption of a 1952 air attack from the USSR with the use of the A-bomb involving a range of 5,000





