

SOVIET DEFECTORS

A STUDY OF PAST DEFECTIONS FROM OFFICIAL SOVIET ESTABLISHMENTS OUTSIDE THE USSR

(Not for Dissemination Outside the Bureau)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
John Edgar Hoover, Director

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PREFACE

Espionage by Soviet officials, operating out of official Soviet establishments in this country, is one of the most important problems faced by the Bureau in discharging its responsibilities in the internal security field. Obviously, penetration of the Soviet intelligence services becomes a prime objective in the Bureau's increasing counterintelligence coverage of these Soviet officials. A defection induced and controlled can result in the development of a double agent. An open defection will produce valuable information concerning Soviet operations. Both are important.

What factors enter into a decision to defect? What is it that finally provides the impetus to break with the Soviet Union? In an attempt to provide the answers to these questions a review has been made of 20 defections from official Soviet establishments outside the USSR since 1929. All known defections in this category have been included, with the exception of one that took place in 1927 about which there is no information as to motive.

Only three of these cases involve defections in the United States. For this reason the bulk of the information available has been received from other intelligence agencies, both in this country and abroad, and from material written by defectors and published subsequent

to defection. Although the information in some cases is not complete, and the number of available cases is too small to permit the drawing of definite conclusions, there are certain important points of similarity which will be pointed out.

For our purposes there are, fundamentally, two basic types of defectors:

1. Induced defectors
2. Uninduced defectors.

The induced defector is one who, although perhaps possessing latent feelings of defection, is persuaded to break with the Soviets and is aided in such action by an opposing intelligence agency. The uninduced defector is one who breaks with the Soviets through his own efforts.

It is from the first group, obviously, that double agents will be developed. It is believed that a knowledge of the facts surrounding past defections will be of assistance in recognizing the problems of potential defectors in the future and in inducing them to defect.

This study includes material taken from public sources and also from secret and ~~top~~ secret sources. The public sources only are set forth at the end of this monograph. A brief biographical sketch of each defector will be found in the Appendix.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

A review of 20 cases of defection from official Soviet establishments outside the USSR from the standpoint of motivation reflects that fear has been the common element in all. Fear has been a factor, in some form and in varying degrees, in every decision by a Soviet official to break with the Soviet regime, or in his ability to adjust to a new life once defection has been accomplished.

Conclusions

Although the number of available cases is too small to permit the drawing of definite conclusions, the following important points of similarity have been noted:

1. Fear for personal safety combined with recall to Russia provided the final impetus to defect in the majority of the cases studied.


2. The location of a defector's wife and children outside of Russia removes a strong deterrent to defection; the fact that his more remote family may still be in Russia does not appear to be a controlling factor.

3. Fear for personal safety has become an obsession with some defectors.

4. Prompt analysis of a potential defector's contacts is important, for in many cases in the past the defector has disclosed his intentions or desires to anti-Soviet friends and even to strangers.

DEFECTORS FROM OFFICIAL SOVIET ESTABLISHMENTS OUTSIDE THE USSR

DATE AND PLACE OF DEFECTION



I. FEAR AS AN ELEMENT IN DEFECTION

Fear is the common element in all defections. Ranging from the vague sense of personal insecurity and helplessness engendered by the strict Soviet regime to the obsession of being liquidated by Soviet agents, fear is a factor in every decision to break with the Soviet Union and affects the ability of the defector to adjust himself to a new life once defection has been accomplished. There is the natural aversion to being considered a traitor to his native land, and the fear of what his friends and relatives will think of him, particularly in view of the possible retaliation by the Soviets upon them for his act. He is afraid to break with everything he has known and start life anew in strange surroundings. And above all he is afraid for his own personal safety. It is necessary that these fears be recognized in each specific case in order that the degree to which each influences the potential defector may be determined. Once recognized, steps may be taken to overcome the fears in his mind and to prepare him psychologically to defect.

Obviously, not every Soviet official abroad is a potential defector. And past cases indicate that even those who entertain thoughts of defection retain a natural feeling of affection for the motherland and an innate loyalty to its institutions. Discontent with the regime is seldom the sole cause for defections. Money, in itself, does not seem to be important

in this respect. Most defections have occurred when outside factors forced the defector into making the definite decision to defect which he had not been able to make by himself because of what seemed to him to be insurmountable obstacles.

Victor A. Kravchenko, who defected from the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C., in April, 1944, described some of these problems which every defector must meet and overcome before defection in his book, I Chose Freedom. He mentioned his feelings at the thought of forever severing his ties with his past life in these words:

"I am cutting my life at its roots... Irrevocably. Perhaps forever. This night I am turning myself into a man without country, without family, without friends."(1)

The thought of being considered a traitor and the fear of being killed by Russian agents also must be taken into consideration. Kravchenko wrote:

"So far as the land of my birth is concerned, I shall be an official outcast and pariah. Automatically the political regime into which I poured a lifetime of toil and faith will pronounce a sentence of death upon me. Always its secret agents will haunt my life. They will trace my steps and keep vigil under my windows and, if ordered by their masters, will strike me down..."(2)

These are personal matters -- strong deterrents to defection that concern the defector himself. To these must be added the realization

that family and friends remaining in Russia may also suffer for his act.

Kravchenko also mentioned this:

"In my home land, those who worked with me and befriended me, let alone those who loved me, will be forever tainted and suspect. To survive they will have to live down my memory. To save themselves, they must deny me and disown me, as in my time I pretended to deny and disown others who incurred the vengeance of the Soviet state.

"Did I have a moral right to endanger these innocent hostages in Russia in order to indulge my own conscience and pay my own debt to truth as I saw it? That was the cruelest problem of all..."(3)

Thus, fear in some form enters into every decision to defect. The number of potential defectors who have found the obstacles too great to overcome will never be known. A knowledge of the problems faced by a potential defector, utilized in the creation of an opportunity to defect with a minimum of difficulty, may be the deciding factor in causing a defection that would otherwise never come about.

II. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF PAST DEFECTIONS

What circumstances are important enough in the eyes of the potential defector to overcome the powerful reasons against defection? The answer to this question will assist materially in recognizing and exploiting similar situations in the future.

In 14 of the 20 cases here studied the defection was primarily brought about by a combination of two elements:

1. Fear for personal safety
2. Recall to Russia.

No matter what other reasons may have contributed to the decision, it took the impetus of some threatened action against the defector personally in the immediate future to convert the thought into action.

Gregory Bessedovsky, who defected in October, 1929, while serving as Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, was reported to have been involved in a scandal. When recalled to Russia he sought the protection of the French authorities.

Walter Krivitsky defected in Paris in October, 1937, while serving as Chief of Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe. He had been requested to assist in the liquidation of his friend, Ignace Reiss.

Instead of carrying out this assignment he warned Reiss, who escaped temporarily only to be later murdered by Soviet agents in Switzerland.

Soon thereafter Krivitsky defected rather than return to the Soviet Union, for he was certain that he was to be punished for this dereliction of duty. (4)

The defections of Alexander Barmine (5) and Alexander Orlov (6) were similar, Barmine defecting in July, 1937, while attached to the Soviet Embassy in Athens, Greece, and Orlov defecting in July, 1938, while serving as a secret police representative in Spain. Each had reason to believe that he was under a cloud. Each received an invitation, amounting to an order, to board a Russian ship under circumstances which indicated that he would become a prisoner of the Soviets and be returned to Russia for disciplinary action.

Ismail Akhmedov broke with the Soviets in June, 1942, while serving as a Soviet military intelligence agent in Turkey. In spite of Akhmedov's story that he had studied specifically to become an intelligence officer so that he could be sent abroad and there defect, he did not actually defect until recalled to Russia under circumstances which clearly indicated that his superiors no longer trusted him.

Igor Gouzenko, who defected in September, 1945, while serving as a code clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, was greatly impressed by the freedom and advantages of life in Canada. Nevertheless, he did not seriously consider defecting until he was ordered back

to Russia under circumstances which appeared to him to be the direct result of his careless handling of confidential documents.

Mikhail M. Koriakov, who left the Soviets in March, 1946, while serving as press attache at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, was a man of strong religious convictions. Koriakov claimed that, while a member of the Soviet Embassy staff, he had compiled the material for a book which he planned to entitle Why I Refuse to Return to Soviet Russia. He claimed that he had been planning defection for some time, but it was only when he was suddenly advised that he was to leave for Russia immediately in what amounted to the custody of two officers that he managed by ruse to elude his guards and make his escape. (7)

Kirill M. Alexeev, who defected in November, 1946, while acting as commercial attache at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, felt that he was under suspicion because of his contacts with foreigners in Mexico City. Also preying on his mind was the fact that his wife had concealed certain information about their family backgrounds which would have serious repercussions should the true facts become known to the Soviet authorities. Although they had discussed defection even before leaving the Soviet Union, it took the shock of recall under circumstances which indicated, to them at least, that disciplinary action was to be taken against them to finally convert the thought of defection into actual break with the Soviet Union.

Grigorii A. Tokaev, who defected in November, 1947, while serving with a technical commission in Berlin, Germany, has been described as a man of strong, dominating personality. He had had differences of opinion with his superior officers concerning his work on the commission, and was under suspicion because of his activities in connection with a German scientist who was also a suspected British agent. He also claimed to have been active in an anti-Stalin group within Russia, leaders of which were in the process of being apprehended at the time of his defection. When ordered back to Moscow, Tokaev "was quite convinced that a return to the capital would be suicide for me."⁽⁸⁾

Oksana S. Kasenkina and Mikhail I. Samarin were teachers in the Soviet school in New York City who defected in July, 1948, when the school was closed and they were ordered back to Russia. Kasenkina had concealed the fact that her husband had been purged in 1937, and feared the possible consequences should the truth become known. Samarin stressed the fact that he, as a non-Party member who had been exposed to life outside of Russia, would be under close surveillance upon his return to the USSR for any indication of anti-Soviet behavior. He said that he had learned to appreciate the freedom enjoyed outside of Russia and had no desire to return to the atmosphere of fear in which the Russian people are forced to live.

Yurii A. Rastvorov, Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) officer who defected in January, 1954, while serving with a Soviet mission in Tokyo, and Vladimir M. Petrov, MVD officer who defected in April, 1954, while serving as Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Australia, were both having difficulties with their superiors. Both defected after being recalled to Moscow under circumstances which indicated to them that drastic punishment awaited them upon their return to Russia.

These examples illustrate the effectiveness of the combination of fear for personal safety and recall to Russia as a means of finally crystallizing a potential defector's latent thoughts of defection into immediate action. In almost all of these cases the defector claimed to have been out of sympathy with the Soviet regime prior to the time he defected. There is, of course, no way in which this can be verified, but since there are probably few Soviet citizens who have not in some way been adversely affected by the strict regimentation which has been the rule in Russia for 37 years, it is probably correct. What must be viewed with caution is the emphasis placed on the part played in defecting by this claimed ideological change.

It is only natural that a defector would build up the ideological phase in an attempt to justify his defection. And undoubtedly the fact that

he may have been out of sympathy with the regime would produce in him latent feelings of defection. But in the usual case this is not enough to actually make him defect. Victor A. Kravchenko and Lev M. Vassiliev are possible exceptions in the 20 cases studied, and their cases warrant brief attention in that regard.

Kravchenko claimed that he defected for ideological reasons only. So far as is known, he was not in trouble with his superiors at the time he defected, nor was he under recall. In fact, he claimed that shortly before he defected he had been recommended by his superiors to be a permanent member of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission staff in the United States. He has stated that he first began to doubt the policies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the farm collectivization program in the early 1930's and that by the time of the purges he had acquired the idea of eventual escape from Russia. During the 1937 purge he was denounced by political enemies, but was cleared in 1938. He came under suspicion again in 1940, was sentenced to two years at hard labor, but the decision was later reversed. So even in Kravchenko's case it is probable that concern for his personal well-being played a large part in his decision to defect in addition to whatever ideological beliefs he held. (9)

Vassiliev defected in December, 1949, while serving as a member of a Soviet Trade Commission in Iran. He merely walked into the American Embassy in Teheran and asked for political asylum, stating that he did not wish to work for the Russians any more. He claimed that he defected for ideological reasons only, and available information does not indicate that he was in trouble or under recall to Russia at the time.

It should be noted that, for our purposes, once a defection is accomplished it is of little importance whether or not the defector has been out of sympathy with the regime for a long time, a short time, or in fact at all, for once the break is made he cannot safely return and has no alternative but to be cooperative.

Other reasons for breaking with the Soviets depend largely on the circumstances of each defector. Georges Agabekov, who defected in June, 1930, in Turkey, publicly stated that he voluntarily severed his connections with the Soviet government because he had lost faith in it, (10) but actually the more apparent and perhaps immediate cause of his defection was his love for an English girl whom he had met while assigned to Istanbul.

In like manner, Vasily M. Sharandak, who defected in August, 1947, while working as a translator at the Soviet Security Headquarters in Hungary, was engaged to an Hungarian girl and had no

desire to return to Russia. His defection was also motivated by his fear that his attempts to get in touch with Hungarian authorities would be discovered.

The ordinary defection causes the defector a great deal of mental anguish over a long period of time. He is beset with doubts and fears, both of defecting and of not defecting, and his mind is ultimately made up for him by circumstances beyond his control. This was not the case, however, with Anatoli I. Skochkov, who defected in February, 1954, while serving as legal advisor to a Soviet mission in Austria. Skochkov defected while on a drunken spree. When he regained his senses and found out what he had done, he was afraid to return to Soviet control. So far as is known his defection was entirely unpremeditated.

It is worthy of note that the defection of Skochkov resulted in the defection in February, 1954, of Petr S. Derjabin, who was attached to the same Soviet mission in Austria. Although Derjabin stated that he was motivated by feelings of discontent because of lack of promotion, reprimands of his superiors and marital difficulties, it was evident that he was in great fear that he would be held responsible for the defection of Skochkov.

Internal events in Russia may provide additional reasons to defect. Leon Helfand, who defected in July, 1940, while serving as Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Rome, has stated that in 1939 only two members of his foreign service class were still alive, the rest having disappeared in the purges. Krivitsky, Barmine, Orlov and Helfand all stated that fear of being included in the purges contributed materially to their decisions to defect. Both Rastvorov and Petrov have stated that the liquidation of Beria in 1953 had a disturbing effect upon MVD agents abroad. It undoubtedly was a contributing factor in the defections of these two men.

III. FAMILY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING DEFECTION

Once the basic reasons to defect are present, no matter how brought about, it appears that the family situation of the defector largely determines whether or not the act of defection will be completed. In this regard, these cases indicate that a distinction should be made between the immediate family of a defector, limited to his spouse and children, and to the more remote relatives, such as parents and brothers and sisters.

Of the 20 defectors involved in this study, 14 had immediate families. Of these 14, 11 were outside the USSR at the time defection took place. It therefore appears that the location of the defector's immediate family might very well be the deciding factor in those cases where immediate families are involved. This is emphasized by a closer study of the three apparent exceptions to the general rule, Barmine, Kravchenko, and Rastvorov.

Barmine's wife died at the time his twin sons were born in Russia in 1923, and the boys were thereafter brought up by Barmine's mother, spending only a few months with Barmine in 1931 and 1932. He had not had close contact with his sons for some years prior to his defection, and it must be remembered that he was engaged to a Greek girl whom he married subsequent to his defection. (11)

Kraychenko had a brief marriage in about 1932 which ended in divorce. He lived with another woman for three years immediately prior to leaving Russia, and in his book I Chose Freedom he refers to this second "wife" whom he left in Russia, describing their relationship as one that was marked by true affection and respect but which "never ripened into a deep all-embracing relationship" because of differences of interests. (12)

Even so, both Barmine and Kravchenko attempted to justify their actions. Barmine writes in One Who Survived that in 1937 he had about decided to ask for recall to Moscow to meet his fate, be it imprisonment, exile or worse, and that he had actually written to his sons that he was returning. When the letter he received in return parroted the official Soviet line concerning the guilt of the prominent persons then involved in the purges in Russia, Barmine said that he realized that if he was imprisoned his sons would believe the official line about him, too, and he would lose them forever. He said that he came to the conclusion that only by staying abroad "could I possibly have a chance to tell them the truth and win them back." (13)

Kraychenko makes much of the fact that his "wife" had no knowledge that he planned never to return to Russia, stating that her best protection was that she be totally ignorant of his intentions.

In justifying his act, he states:

"It was not my fault that I was leaving my country. It was the fault of a corrupt and inhuman regime. The only thing left that I could do for my suffering people was to escape, then try to tell the world all I knew as best I could. Such was the dictate of my Russian heritage. Such was the logic of my whole life."⁽¹⁴⁾

Rastvorov was married on January 21, 1945, and his daughter was born on October 21, 1945. His wife is a ballerina with a troupe in Moscow. He has stated that he had wanted to take his wife and daughter to Japan with him, but had been afraid to ask permission to do so because his wife had been investigated on two occasions as one of a group who in about 1945 had accepted a ride from an American military officer in Moscow. After his defection it was reported that Rastvorov was particularly concerned about what might happen to his daughter and to his father. He desired that there should be no publicity about his defection in order to protect them as much as possible.

Ismail Akhmedov's wife died in Russia a few months prior to the time of his defection, and he has stated that this breaking of his last tie within the Soviet Union contributed materially to crystallizing his resolve to defect. Oksana Kasenkina's husband had been purged in 1937 and her only son had been listed as missing in action in 1942. She had no immediate family to draw her back to Russia.

While it is presumed that Skochkov's wife and child resided outside of Russia at the time of his defection in Austria, whether they did or did not is immaterial, for in his case it does not appear that their whereabouts had any bearing on his decision to defect.

On the other hand, the location in Russia of a more remote family apparently will not prevent a defector from breaking with the Soviets when the other reasons to defect are present. Available information indicates that in at least 11 of the 20 cases reviewed the defector left some of his more remote family in Russia, either one or both parents or brothers or sisters. Although the defector is plagued with a feeling of self-reproach at the possible repercussions which might be taken against his family by the Soviets, he nonetheless defects. Some emphasize the point that the family were unaware of any intention to defect, implying that perhaps retribution in such case might not be so drastic. Orlov even wrote a letter to Stalin in which he threatened to expose all he knew about Stalin should anything happen to his mother and the mother of his wife who were still in Russia.

Georges Agabekov was single, but his parents were still in Russia at the time he defected. Sharandak and Vassiliev were not married at the time they defected, but there is no information available concerning their relatives.

These cases point up the fact that the location of the wife and children of a potential defector may control his decision to break with the Soviets, whereas the location of his more remote family, although carrying some weight, is not necessarily decisive.

IV. PERSONALITY FACTORS IN DEFECTION

Several of these defectors have shown signs of emotional instability. While this is by no means true in every case, there are certain psychological factors inherent in the act of defection that will affect every defector to some degree, depending upon the individual personality involved.

The fear for the personal safety of himself and his family appears to be the largest single factor involved. In some cases this has amounted to an obsession; in all cases it is a contributing factor in a defector's subsequent adjustment to his new life. The terroristic regimentation of the Russian people for 37 years, with emphasis on the dire consequences to befall anyone who opposes the regime, well illustrated by past purges and liquidations, has produced in the Soviet mind an inherent fear which cannot be quickly dissipated.

Agabekov wrote of his fears in his book OGPU - The Russian Secret Terror. (15) He disappeared under mysterious circumstances in 1938.

Krivitsky was obsessed by the fear of being liquidated and ostensibly committed suicide in 1941. He was an extremely nervous man who distrusted everyone. In his book In Stalin's Secret Service

he wrote:

"I know that a price has been put on my head. The assassins are after me, and they will not spare even my wife or child. I have often risked my life for my cause, but I do not wish to die now for nothing." (16)

Barmine has been described as being a highly emotional and excitable person. His second wife has stated that during their entire married life Barmine was possessed of a great fear which she believed to be the result of his youth in the Soviet Union, where he had been taught to accept appointments from a State and not to battle for himself in a capitalistic world. During the first years after his defection he was in great fear of being killed or injured by Soviet agents and insisted that his wife be with him at all times. In his book One Who Survived Barmine writes that every Soviet official who stays abroad without authorization is automatically deprived of citizenship and condemned to death. (17)

Kravchenko has been described as being emotionally unstable and extremely nervous. His book reflects his fears for his personal safety. (18) This fear became an obsession with Orlov and his wife, who remained in hiding for 15 years, living in extreme fear for their lives and believing themselves to be among the top defectors scheduled for assassination by Soviet agents. Even after 15 years they were afraid to have their identity become known for fear it might aid Soviet agents in

tracking them down. Orlov wrote in his book, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes :

"The Kremlin is jealous of its secrets and it will do everything in its power to destroy me in order to instill fear in the hearts of other high officials who might be tempted to follow my example."(19)

After Rastvorov defected, it was reported that his greatest fear was that some day he would be kidnapped by the Soviets and either returned to Russia or destroyed. He even inquired as to whether self-destruction pills could be furnished to him at such time as he is released from protective custody.

Alexeev was a temperamental man, torn by fears of assassination or of being returned to the Soviet Union. He was emotionally dependent upon his wife, the dominant personality in the family, and found it extremely difficult to adjust himself to life in the United States. After his wife became seriously ill, his despair reached such a state that there were indications that in desperation he might attempt to commit suicide or try to return to Russia.

The Kasenkina defection illustrates the mental turmoil undergone by a defector in breaking with the Soviets. She apparently had no strong political or ideological beliefs to aid in her decision. Once having accomplished her defection, a major crisis she was poorly equipped to cope with in view of her limited experience, she became frightened at what she had done. In her mental confusion during the first few days of comparative

inactivity and letdown immediately following the excitement of her defection, she wrote a letter to the Soviet Consul General in New York which ultimately resulted in her return to Soviet control. She then realized that she was a prisoner and would be punished upon arrival in Moscow. In desperation she attempted to escape, fell from a third floor window, and eventually received asylum in the United States.

Kasenkina and Samarin were school teachers who had had very limited practical experience, especially outside the Soviet Union. Neither was an aggressive type; both were plagued by doubts as to whether or not they should defect. Samarin's wife has stated that after he was recalled to Russia Samarin went through a period of horrible indecision because of his intense desire to remain in the United States and the vivid knowledge of the retribution which would fall on both their families if he defected. His basic instability was apparently aggravated by doubt and remorse, and his inability to properly adjust himself to life in the United States, resulting later in his commitment to a mental institution.

Koriakov and Tokaev illustrate other types of personalities that may be encountered in these cases. Koriakov was an extremely religious idealist. Brought up in an atheistic environment, he writes in his book I'll Never Go Back that his attitude toward God was one of complete indifference until 1941, during the defense of Moscow, when his religious awakening began. (20)

Tokaev possessed a strong, dominating personality, a great love for Russia, and an almost fanatic hatred of Stalin and his regime.

As a rule these persons had received a better than average education. Many had held responsible positions in the Soviet Government. Soviet citizens chosen by their Government to serve in official positions abroad are carefully chosen. They are investigated completely to insure that they are ideologically and politically sound, and they are instructed thoroughly as to their conduct abroad. Of the 20 here considered there is information indicating that 17 were Communist Party or Komsomol (Communist Youth League) members. In one case there is no information concerning Party membership. Only the two school teachers, Kasenkina and Samarin, definitely stated that they had no record of Party membership.

An understanding of the psychological problems involved in past defections should help in the recognition of special problems arising in this field in future cases. Once recognized, steps may be taken to allay the fears and smooth the way to defection.

V. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO DEFECTION

Living and working in the atmosphere of fear and suspicion engendered by the Soviet system, it is impossible for the potential Soviet defector to discuss his problems with his Soviet friends, or even to admit that he has thought about defection. To do so would be, in itself, an "anti-Soviet" act leading to dire consequences.

That the human desire to confide in some one, to talk over problems, and to seek advice, very often prevails, is illustrated in these cases. The person approached was usually a non-Russian friend of the defector although in some instances it has even been a total stranger.

For example, Krivitsky went to an old friend then living in Paris who agreed to help him. (21) Barmine, in the absence of his fiancée, took her brother into his confidence and secured his assistance. (22) Koriakov has stated that he disclosed his intentions to anti-Soviet friends in Paris. (23)

Alexeev has stated that in spite of warnings from his superiors not to associate with foreigners, two of his foreign friends in Mexico City knew of his plans to defect. Tokaev appealed to a German friend who refused to help him because of his fear of the Russians and the risk involved. (24)

Kasenkina and Samarin, in their desperation, turned to strangers for assistance. Although neither knew the other was defecting, their

defections bear a striking similarity. Kasenkina discussed her problems with chance acquaintances met in a public park, explaining later that she deliberately took chances with strangers in order to find some one to assist her in remaining in the United States. She eventually called upon the editor of a Russian language newspaper in New York who directed her to persons interested in refugee matters.

Samarin struck up a conversation with a stranger in a public park who later provided Samarin with the name of a refugee group where Samarin received aid. In Samarin's case it is interesting to note that some years prior to the time he defected, he had discussed his desire to remain in the United States with a friend who was his French teacher.

Rastvorov has stated that he had discussed his dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime with an American friend in Tokyo prior to the time he broke with the Soviets. And Petrov confided in a friend whose acquaintance he had made in Australia, although in this case the "friend" had meticulously cultivated Petrov under the direction of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization.

In several cases there were negotiations or attempts at negotiation with a foreign government by the defector prior to the time he actually defected. Agabekov is reported to have approached British authorities in Istanbul with an offer to disclose intelligence information

four months before he actually defected but apparently met with no success. Helfand made secret arrangements to come to the United States with the help of the United States Ambassador then stationed in Rome.

Akhmedov, who defected in June, 1942, has stated that he went to the American Consulate in Turkey in January, 1942, with the idea of breaking with the Soviets but found no encouragement. This contact was allegedly arranged by an American newspaperman then stationed in Istanbul.

Kravchenko first made contact with a prominent anti-Soviet writer in New York City, who in turn brought Kravchenko into contact with this Bureau. Here again, it is interesting to note that Kravchenko has said that he was aided in his defection by two non-Russian employees of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission.

Tokaev wrote of his attempts to negotiate anonymously for asylum with representatives of foreign governments in Berlin and of the near failure of these attempts because of his refusal to give his real name or nationality. (25)

These examples of predefection activity on the part of past defectors emphasize the necessity of prompt analysis of all contacts of Soviet officials in order that potential defectors may be recognized and exploited.

VI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This review of past defections from official Soviet installations outside the USSR has disclosed certain common factors which may be recognized in future cases of potential defectors from official Soviet establishments in the United States. An understanding of the part played by fear and of the necessity for analyzing the specific fears involved in each case to determine their relative importance will enable positive steps to be taken to counteract such fears. The circumstances of each potential defector, the location of his immediate family, whether or not he is under recall, and whether under suspicion, are important considerations in selecting likely subjects for further attention. The prompt analysis of unusual activities may identify those Soviets who are psychologically ready for approach.

Finally, in order to facilitate defection, an opportunity to defect is important. Assuming that all conditions are favorable to defection, without an opportunity, clearly identified to the Soviet, he may not defect, or if he does do so, unassisted, the possibility of a double-agent operation may be lost. Fear and distrust of intelligence agencies and agents may preclude the direct approach, but whatever the means, direct or indirect, a clear opportunity, presented at the psychologically correct time, may well be the deciding factor in the mind of the defector. And control of the opportunity will lead naturally to control of the subsequent activities of the defector to the advantage of the Bureau.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

Gregory Bessedovsky

Georges Agabekov

Walter G. Krivitsky

Alexander Barmine

Alexander Orlov

Leon Helfand

Ismail Akhmedov

Victor A. Kraychenko

Igor S. Gouzenko

Mikhail M. Koriakov

Kirill M. Alexeev

Vasily M. Sharandak

Grigorii A. Tokaev

Oksana S. Kasenkina

Mikhail I. Samarin

Lev M. Vassiliev

Yurii A. Rastvorov

Anatoli I. Skochkov

Petr S. Derjabin

Vladimir M. Petrov

GREGORY BESSEDOVSKY

Gregory Bessedovsky was born in Poltava, Russia, in 1896. After taking part in the revolution and serving in the Red Army as a political commissar, he was elected president of the Economic Council of the Poltava District and served as a member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Bessedovsky was stationed in Vienna in 1921 and 1922 as head of the consular section of the Soviet Legation. From 1923 to 1925 he served as counsellor of the Soviet Legation at Vienna. In 1926 he was sent in the same capacity to Tokyo. In 1927 or early 1928 he arrived in Paris as counsellor of the Soviet Embassy there.

Bessedovsky incurred the displeasure of his superiors in Moscow and an emissary was sent to Paris with instructions to bring Bessedovsky back to Russia. Although virtually under arrest, in October, 1929, Bessedovsky managed to escape from the Embassy and to obtain the protection of the French police.

GEORGES AGABEKOV

Georges Agabekov was born in 1895 in Ashkhabad in the Central Asia region of Russia. He left the Tashkent Institute of Oriental Languages to serve in the Red Army. After joining the Communist Party in 1918, he was ordered by the Party in 1920 to join the local Cheka, later known as the OGPU, the Russian secret police organization. He served in various assignments in Central Asia until May 6, 1928, when he became chief of the Eastern Section of the OGPU at Moscow. In October, 1929, he became the secret OGPU resident in Constantinople under the cover of being a Persian merchant.

Agabekov has said that he began to doubt that the regime of repression was good for Russia while working in Moscow in 1928, becoming more and more disillusioned until he finally resolved to break with the Soviets. However, from other sources it has been reported that while in Constantinople Agabekov met and fell in love with an English girl. Her parents disapproved of the match and sent the girl to Paris in June, 1930, in an attempt to break up the affair. A week later Agabekov defected and followed his fiancée to Paris. He died under mysterious circumstances in 1938.

WALTER G. KRIVITSKY

Walter G. Krivitsky was born on June 28, 1899, in Podwoloczyska, then a part of Poland. At the age of 20 he joined the Communist Party. From 1920 until 1937 he was employed by Soviet military intelligence, serving in various sections of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army General Staff. During 1933 and 1934 he was director of the War Industries Institute. In 1935 he was appointed chief of Soviet military intelligence for Western Europe, the position he continued to fill until his defection in October, 1937.

In May, 1937, Krivitsky returned to his headquarters in The Hague from a visit to Moscow greatly disturbed at what he had seen of the purges then taking place in the Red Army. In Paris in July, 1937, he was asked to arrange for the liquidation of a Soviet intelligence agent, his friend Ignace Reiss. Krivitsky, instead, managed to warn Reiss, but realized that he would have to explain his part in the affair to Moscow. On August 10, 1937, he was recalled to Russia and made arrangements to depart, but this recall was cancelled. He was again ordered to return to Moscow, but in the meantime Reiss had been murdered in Switzerland and Krivitsky realized that his own position was desperate. Although under close surveillance, he managed to communicate with an old friend in Paris who agreed to help him. Krivitsky checked out of his hotel early on the morning of October 6, 1937, as if to start his journey to Moscow, but instead broke with the Soviets and remained in France. He came to the United States in 1938, and was found dead in a Washington, D. C., hotel room on February 10, 1941, ostensibly a suicide.

ALEXANDER BARMINE

Alexander Barmine was born on August 16, 1899, in Mohileff, Russia, the son of a school teacher. He graduated from high school in Kiev in June, 1918, and in 1919 he volunteered for the Red Army and joined the Communist Party. After completing a six-month course at the Infantry Officers School at Gomel, he was assigned to a reserve regiment of infantry in the Polish campaign.

In the Fall of 1920 Barmine was ordered to the General Staff College in Moscow. He also enrolled in a special school of Oriental studies conducted jointly by the War College and the Foreign Office for students of both institutions. During his three-year course of study he was detached for brief periods on two occasions, the first time to serve as military attache of a Russian mission to Bokhara, and the other time to act as second secretary of the Soviet Embassy at Riga, Latvia. He graduated summa cum laude from the General Staff College on July 10, 1923. On July 12, 1923, his wife died at the time of the birth of his twin sons.

In 1923 Barmine retired from the Red Army with the rank of brigadier general, but he remained in the active reserve until 1935 and his various assignments subsequent to 1923 were all subject to the approval of the General Staff of the Red Army.

From 1923 to 1925 Barmine acted as USSR consul general in Persia. From 1925 to 1929 he was assigned to the Foreign Trade Department as a member of the board of directors of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (International Book Company) in Moscow. In January, 1929, he left for Paris to work with the Soviet trade delegation and by the end of 1930 he had been promoted to the post of assistant trade representative and director general of imports.

In 1931 Barmine spent a few months in Italy as director general of imports at Milan, and in 1932 he served as Soviet trade representative in Brussels, Belgium. From November, 1932, until the end of 1933 he was first vice-president of Stanko-Import, the machine-tool importing trust. In 1933 he was also a member of a special Soviet good-will mission to Poland. During 1934 and 1935 he was president of the Auto-Moto-Export Trust, an organization set up to control exports of automobiles and armaments. In December, 1935, he was appointed first secretary of the Soviet Legation at Athens, Greece, becoming Charge d'Affaires early in 1937, the position he held at the time he broke with the Soviets in July, 1937.

Barmine became engaged to a Greek girl. He was apprehensive because of the purge of the Red Army then in progress, and afraid of what his sons in Russia would think if he was brought home and purged.

On July 16, 1937, an attempt was made to lure him aboard a Soviet vessel on the pretext of dining with the captain. Barmine was convinced that if he boarded the ship he would not be allowed to leave. In the company of his fiancée's brother he went to the Legation, sent a telegram to Moscow that he was departing on annual leave, picked up his passport and some personal effects and walked out. The next day he departed by train to join his fiancée in Paris. On December 1, 1937, he publicly announced his break with the Soviets.

ALEXANDER ORLOV

Alexander Orlov was born on August 21, 1895, in Moscow, Russia. He joined the Communist Party in 1917. During 1917 and 1918 he was chief of the information service of the Supreme Finance Council of the Soviet Union. From 1918 to 1920 he commanded guerrilla detachments and served as a counterintelligence officer in the Red Army on the Southwest Front. From 1920 to 1921 he was chief of investigations and counterintelligence of the Frontier Department of Northern Russia and from 1921 to 1923 he served as chief investigator and assistant prosecutor of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. During much of this period he attended Moscow University Law School, where he received his law degree.

In 1924 Orlov was appointed deputy chief of the Economic Department of the OGPU and in 1925 he was appointed commander of frontier troops in Transcaucasia. From 1926 to 1935 he served as chief of the Economic Division of the Foreign Department of the OGPU (known as the NKVD after 1934). In 1935 he was appointed deputy chief of the Department for Railways and Sea Transport of the NKVD and in July, 1936, he was sent to Spain as an advisor to the Spanish Republican Government on matters pertaining to counterintelligence and guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines.

Orlov has stated that his first serious doubts about the Soviet regime arose shortly before he left for Spain in 1936 and after he had witnessed the first purge trial where sixteen men who had been leaders in the revolution were executed. In 1937 he learned that several close friends had been convicted in the second purge trial, including a first cousin who was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Russia. In July, 1938, he received instructions to attend a meeting aboard a ship at Antwerp, Belgium. Convinced that this was a trap, Orlov escaped with his wife and daughter to Paris. He left Paris immediately for Canada and entered the United States on August 13, 1938. In great fear for his life, Orlov remained under cover until 1953.

LEON HELFAND

Leon Helfand was born on December 10, 1900, in Poltava, Russia. His father was a wealthy landowner and Helfand was educated in a school near Poltava. From 1918 to 1921 he served in the Ukrainian Army, becoming a member of the General Staff. In 1922 he was appointed to a high post in the Ministry of Communications and in 1923 he became the head of the Industrial Trust of Transportation in Russia.

In 1924 Helfand applied for foreign service. During 1925 he studied in various divisions of the Foreign Office, and in March, 1926, he was sent to the Russian Embassy in Paris to work and to study the French language. In 1927 he was appointed second secretary of the Paris Embassy, later advancing to first secretary.

From 1930 to 1933 Helfand was assigned to the Foreign Office in Moscow. In December, 1933, he was appointed first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Rome, subsequently becoming counsellor, and from 1938 until his defection in July, 1940, he was in charge of Embassy affairs in Rome.

Helfand has stated that he first thought of leaving the Soviets during the purges of 1936 and 1937, but that the real reason he left when he did was the signing of the Russo-German Pact in June, 1940. In 1939 he remarked that only two members of his Foreign Service class were still

alive. Shortly before he defected in July, 1940, Helfand told the American Ambassador in Rome that he was being recalled to Moscow, that he felt certain that he would be liquidated, and requested aid in getting to the United States. When the time came for him to depart, Helfand ostensibly left for Russia. However, a short distance from Rome he secretly left the train, boarded a plane for Lisbon, Portugal, and ultimately reached the United States.

ISMAIL AKHMEDOV

Ismail Akhmedov was born on June 17, 1904, in Orsk, Russia. His father was a school teacher of Turkish origin. At the age of 14 Akhmedov joined the Komsomol (Communist youth organization), and in 1920 he entered the Institute of Oriental Languages at Orenburg. He joined the Communist Party in 1921 and in the same year was sent to Bukhara as a propagandist.

Akhmedov entered the Military School of Signal Communications at Leningrad in 1925, graduating as a lieutenant in 1929. He was assigned to a Red Army unit in Tiflis, and during the winter of 1929-1930 he studied the German language at the Tiflis Evening Institute of Foreign Languages. In 1930 he became a military interpreter.

In 1931 Akhmedov entered the Military Electrical Academy at Leningrad, graduating as a captain in 1936. He spent the next two years at the Scientific Institute of Signal Communications near Moscow. In 1938 he entered the General Staff Academy of the Red Army at Moscow and upon graduation as a major in 1940 he was appointed chief of the Fourth Division of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Red Army.

In June, 1941, Akhmedov was sent to Germany under cover of being a Tass representative, to verify intelligence reports that Germany

planned to invade Russia. After two weeks Germany did attack Russia and Akhmedov was interned. He was included with other Russians who were being exchanged via Turkey for Germans held in Russia, and in July, 1941, he was ordered to remain in Turkey as the legal resident of the Red Army Intelligence Department with the cover of press attache at the Soviet Embassy.

Akhmedov has stated that as early as 1937 he had broken inwardly with the Soviet regime. While in Turkey he differed with the ambassador and others attached to the embassy on matters of policy and procedure. Derogatory reports concerning Akhmedov were forwarded to Moscow and he was ordered back to Russia. A few months before, his wife had died in Russia, breaking his last close tie with his homeland. Fearing for his safety if he should return to Russia, Akhmedov first appealed to the American consul general in Turkey, but without success. In May, 1942, he was granted protection by the Turkish authorities.

VICTOR A. KRAVCHENKO

Victor A. Kravchenko was born on October 11, 1905, in Dniepropetrovsk in the Ukraine. In 1922 he joined the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization. During 1922 and 1923 he worked in the Donbas mines, returning to Dniepropetrovsk to continue his schooling under Komsomol direction in 1924 and 1925. In about 1926 he served in a cavalry unit of the Red Army and during 1927 he was stationed on the Afghanistan-Persian borders with a unit of border troops under the jurisdiction of the OGPU. In 1928 he contracted a tropical disease and was returned to Kiev for treatment.

In 1929 Kravchenko entered the Technical Institute at Kharkov and officially joined the Communist Party. He received an engineering degree in 1934. During his period of study, he carried out various assignments for the Communist Party, including teaching political economy in a Party school and, in 1932, acting as a representative of the Political Department during the period of farm collectivization in the Ukraine.

After working in Dniepropetrovsk from 1934 to 1936, Kravchenko was transferred to the Nikopol Metallurgical Combine and became chief of the Technical Division in Nikopol. During the purge period of 1936 and 1937, he was denounced by political enemies, but in 1938 he was cleared of all charges and made chief of the Taganrog Metallurgical Combine. In 1939 he was put in charge of a secret metallurgical construction project in Siberia.

Kravchenko was charged with irregularities in management and condemned to one year at hard labor. He appealed and the sentence was reduced to confinement to his factory and attachment of his salary. While still under this sentence, he was transferred to Moscow as an official with the metallurgical organization there. In August, 1941, he was called into the Red Army as a captain in an engineer battalion. His sentence was revoked and he was sent to the front where he participated in the defense of Moscow and was hospitalized. Upon recovery, he was discharged from the army and appointed chief engineer for 13 factories in the Moscow area, later becoming chief of Section of Engineer Armament for the Council of People's Commissars. This led to his assignment in the United States, where he arrived on August 18, 1943, as engineer inspector of material for the Metals Division of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission.

Kravchenko has stated that the year 1932 marked his first deviation from Party ideology and that by the time he came to the United States he had definitely made up his mind that if he ever had a chance to get outside the Soviet Union he would seize the opportunity and never return to Russia. He left Washington, D. C., secretly on April 1, 1944, and went to New York City, where on April 4, 1944, he published a statement of resignation from the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission and declared his intention to break with the Soviet Union and remain in the United States.

IGOR S. GOUZENKO

Igor S. Gouzenko was born in Moscow, Russia, on January 13, 1919. He attended primary and secondary schools and at 17 was a member of Komsomol, the Communist youth organization. He entered the Academy of Engineering at Moscow, but after only two months was inducted into the Red Army and sent to a special code school conducted by the General Staff of the Red Army. He was then assigned to the Main Intelligence Division of the Red Army in Moscow where he worked in the Central Code Room. In May, 1942, he was sent to the front for about one year, attaining the rank of lieutenant in the Red Army.

Toward the end of 1942 it was decided to send Gouzenko abroad and on July 20, 1943, he arrived in Canada as a cipher clerk in the office of the military attache of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa.

Gouzenko was first recalled to Russia in September, 1944, but this order was cancelled. In 1945 he got into trouble through his careless handling of confidential documents and he was again recalled, effective September 6, 1945.

Gouzenko had been impressed with the freedom of the individual which he had seen in Canada and was having a struggle with himself over whether to return to Russia. He finally decided to break with the Soviets

and on September 5, 1945, he left the Embassy with certain documents he had previously marked for removal. He first attempted to give his story to the Canadian press in Ottawa, without success. It was not until September 7, 1945, after his defection had become known to the Soviets, that he finally was placed in protective custody by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

MIKHAIL M. KORIAKOV

Mikhail M. Koriakov was born on June 22, 1911, in a small Siberian village. His father was a farmer. After graduation from high school in Kansk in 1929, he worked as a newspaperman and traveled throughout Russia. During 1939 and 1940 he was a scientific worker at the Tolstoi Museum at Yasnaya Polyana. From about 1936 to 1940 he studied by correspondence at the Moscow Institute of Philosophy, Literature and History.

From 1941 to 1945 Koriakov was in the Red Army, starting as a private and advancing to the rank of captain. Most of his army service was as a military correspondent although for a brief time he commanded an infantry company. He was captured by the Germans on April 22, 1945. When the war ended a month later, he made his way to Paris with the definite idea of breaking with the Soviets. He had become a deeply religious man and was extremely dissatisfied with conditions in Russia. On May 22, 1945, he was employed by the Soviet Embassy in Paris as second secretary in the press attache's office, to work on a paper called News From Home.

On March 18, 1946, Koriakov was suddenly told that he was to return to Russia that same day under what amounted to protective custody of a captain of the Russian Repatriation Commission. Through a ruse he managed to escape to the protection of friends in Paris.

KIRILL M. ALEXEEV

Kirill M. Alexeev was born on June 1, 1908, in Lebedian, Russia. His father was a merchant and at one time had been mayor of Lebedian. Alexeev attended school in Lebedian from 1915 to 1923 and art school in Moscow from 1923 to 1925. In 1925 he entered the Central Institute of Labor, graduating in 1926 as a qualified plumber. In 1927 he entered the Metallurgical Technicum, graduating in 1929 as a technician. During this period of study he was also working as a plumber at the First Die Factory in Moscow.

In 1930 Alexeev enrolled in the Metallurgical Division of the Mining Academy in Moscow, graduating in 1935 with the degree of Metallurgical Engineer. From 1935 to 1937 he did graduate work at the Mining Academy, receiving the degree of Candidate of Technical Science.

In 1937 Alexeev was appointed chief engineer for the building of an ammunition factory near Moscow. In 1940 he was transferred to another ammunition factory in the same area. When the war began in 1941 he was appointed chief engineer of Construction Bureau No. 1 in Moscow. In June, 1942, he was appointed to Scientific Research Institute No. 8, where he did research on new armaments until November, 1942, when he was appointed chief metallurgist at an ammunition factory

near Moscow. In February, 1943, he was appointed chief metallurgist of the Special Trust of the aviation industry in Moscow, where he remained until February, 1944, just prior to his departure for Mexico.

Although a Komsomol (Communist youth organization) member in his youth, Alexeev claimed that he never became a Communist Party member. He has stated that at an early age he became dissatisfied with life in Russia and finally sought a foreign assignment. In May, 1944, Alexeev left for Mexico with an appointment in the office of the counsellor on trade in the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Alexeev came under suspicion because of his many contacts with foreigners in Mexico City. He was recalled to Russia in October, 1946, but managed to delay his departure because of the illness of one of his children. Just before the arrival of another Soviet vessel at a Mexican port, Alexeev and his family secretly left Mexico City on November 27, 1946, and arrived in New York City on December 1, 1946. He contacted the editor of a Russian language newspaper for help, and eventually received the protection of a refugee organization.

VASILY M. SHARANDAK

Vasily M. Sharandak was born on May 8, 1923 in Olkhovata in the Ukraine. His father was a farmer. In the 1930's the family farm became part of a collective farm and the family lived in extreme poverty and semistarvation. From 1930 to 1938 Sharandak attended elementary schools and in 1939 he received a scholarship to a premedical high school where he remained until the outbreak of the Russo-German War. While at school he became a member of the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization.

After the Germans invaded the Ukraine, Sharandak remained on the farm with his father until 1942, when he volunteered for work in Germany. He was put in a party of Ukrainian slave workers and sent to Austria. As a result of his attempts to escape he was imprisoned in Hungary from May, 1943, until March 29, 1945, the day before the Russians arrived. After his release he remained in Hungary, became engaged to a Hungarian girl, and from April, 1945, to July, 1947, was employed as a translator at the Russian Security Headquarters in Hungary.

Sharandak has stated that ever since the end of the war it had been his firm intention not to return to Russia and that at the

beginning of 1946 he began to lay the groundwork for staying behind when the Russians departed. In June, 1947, he attempted to contact a person connected with a British mission in Hungary but was received with suspicion. He decided to defect before the Russians could find out about his action and went into hiding with his fiancée's family. He was almost caught in the Russian investigation into his disappearance, but eventually was able to cross the frontier on foot where he found asylum with the British.

GRIGORII A. TOKAEV

Grigorii A. Tokaev was born on October 13, 1909, in the northern Caucasus. His father, a peasant, died in 1918. All through the revolution and the civil war of 1918-1921 his father and older brothers had been confirmed Marxist-Leninists and in 1925 Tokaev joined the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization. He received no primary education but learned to read and write as part of his family life. From 1924 to 1928 he worked as a tractor driver-mechanic. In 1928 he was directed by the provincial Council of Trade Unions to attend the Workers' Faculty of the Leningrad Mining Academy. It was in Leningrad that he states he had his first doubts as to the direction in which Stalin was leading Russia.

In 1932 Tokaev joined the Communist Party. He was at that time studying at the Workers' Faculty of the Moscow Higher Technical School, having transferred from Leningrad in 1930. In May, 1932, he entered the Engineering Faculty of the Zhukovski Military Air Academy at Moscow. He graduated in May, 1937, as a Military Engineer Mechanic of Aircraft Construction, remaining at the Academy to do scientific engineering work in the Aerodynamics Laboratory. In the Summer of 1938 he was appointed head of this laboratory. Early in 1941 he got into trouble with the Communist Party and was transferred to the post of senior

assistant director of the Scientific Research Department of the Academy. He attained the rank of engineer lieutenant colonel.

In June, 1945, Tokaev was sent to Berlin by the Soviet air force as an aviation specialist to the Air Division of the Soviet Military Administration. From June to August, 1945, he was an advisor on aviation matters to the Soviet delegation at the Potsdam Conference. He later acted as First Soviet Secretary to the Allied Control Council in Berlin.

On April 17, 1947, Tokaev became deputy president of a new commission to direct research into piloted rocket planes. In about September, 1947, he left this work to become a senior officer attached to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany.

Tokaev's independent attitude caused him trouble with the Communist Party and with his superiors at various times during his career. He also claimed to have been associated with an anti-Stalin group in Russia. In September, 1947, Tokaev spent a month in Russia and by the time he returned to Berlin members of the underground group were being picked up by the authorities. He has said that during October, 1947, he was warned four times by a friend that the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) was closing in on him. In that same month he was ordered back to Russia and it became apparent that he was under suspicion. His attempts to negotiate with the Canadian Military Mission for asylum were to no immediate avail as he refused to disclose his identity. A German doctor whom he had befriended was afraid to help him. Finally, in a last desperate attempt, he was able to escape with his wife and daughter to the protection of the British.

OKSANA S. KASENKINA

Oksana S. Kasenkina was born in about 1896 in Rostov, Russia. Her father was a master mechanic in a locomotive works. She graduated from Mazurenko's High School for Girls, a private school, in 1914 and eventually became a teacher in a trade school near Slavyansk, where she met her future husband, also a teacher. At the time of their marriage in 1920 they were both attending the University of Moscow.

Kasenkina has stated that neither she nor her husband was a member of the Communist Party. Her husband was seized by the NKVD in 1937 and she never heard from him again. She taught in Moscow from 1937 to 1941, moved to Gorki during the siege of Moscow, and then returned to teach in Moscow. Her only son, who had been drafted into the Red Army, was reported missing in action on January 12, 1942.

Kasenkina arrived in the United States on July 15, 1946. She taught at the Soviet Private School in New York City until it closed and she was scheduled to depart for Russia with the rest of the teachers on July 31, 1948. She has stated that upon first learning that she was being assigned to teach in the United States she had in her mind that she would not return to Russia. For some reason the authorities had missed the fact that her husband had been purged and she knew that she would

suffer if this fact should later be revealed.

Kasenkina's attempt to defect almost resulted disastrously. Not knowing which way to turn, she first approached several strangers for help without success. She then contacted the editor of a Russian language newspaper who placed her in touch with persons interested in refugee matters. On the day she was to leave, she loaded her luggage into a taxicab as if to go to the pier, but instead went to a prearranged haven. She became frightened and upset in her new surroundings and wrote a letter to the Soviet consul general in New York City which eventually resulted in her return to Soviet control. She soon realized that she was a prisoner and would be punished upon arrival in Russia. Her escape from the Consulate resulted in her well-publicized fall from the third floor of the Consulate building on August 12, 1948.

MIKHAIL I. SAMARIN

Mikhail I. Samarin was born on January 21, 1908, in Yakovlevo, Russia, the son of a leather worker. He attended school for four years at Podolsk and for four years at Moscow, graduating in 1935 after a final four years spent at the Moscow Institute of Pedagogy. Until 1939 he was a high school teacher in Moscow. He then taught at a Soviet school in Bucharest, Rumania, until June, 1941. Drafted into the Red Army in 1941, he served until receiving a medical discharge in the Spring of 1943. In December, 1943, he arrived in Washington, D.C., as director of the Soviet Private School. In July, 1946, he was transferred to the Soviet Private School in New York City.

Samarin has stated that he never belonged to the Communist youth organization, Komsomol, or to the Communist Party. He desired to raise his children with the advantages available to them in this country and was fearful of the suspicion he would be under upon his return to Russia, for he was a non-Party member who had been outside of Russia for several years. When the Soviet Private School in New York City was closed, Samarin and his family were ordered to sail from New York on July 31, 1948, to return to Russia. Determined to remain in the United States, Samarin mentioned his problem to a stranger whom he casually met on the street and was directed to a refugee organization where he secured the assistance which led to his defection on the night of July 30, 1948.

LEV M. VASSILIEV

Lev M. Vassiliev was born on January 7, 1903, in Leningrad, Russia. He attended grade and secondary schools in Leningrad, Simferopol and Moscow, graduating from the Plekhanov Institute of People's Economics in 1926. Until 1936 he was employed by the Finance Commissariat and by local industries in Uzbek SSR. From 1936 to 1939 he worked in the Vladivostok area for the Food Commissariat, first as chief of the Planning Division and later as manager of a construction project for the development of the fish industry.

For three months in 1939 Vassiliev acted as temporary deputy chief of the Finance Division of the Ministry of Local Industries in Moscow. He was then appointed economist and deputy director of a military plant in Pavlograd, and while on this job was evacuated to Turkestan in 1942. Later in 1942 he became the head of a construction office in the city of Turkestan.

In 1943 Vassiliev was commissioned into the Red Army and sent to Iran to expedite lend-lease shipments from the United States to Russia. After the war he remained in Iran attached to the Soviet Embassy as a member of a Soviet trade commission.

In December, 1949, Vassiliev appeared at the American Embassy in Teheran, Iran, and declared that he no longer desired to work for the Russians and wanted political asylum. He was flown to Germany and then to the United States. He steadfastly claimed that he defected for ideological reasons and that he had been opposed to Communism for a long time, particularly the harshness, cruelty and duplicity of the Soviet leaders.

YURI A. RASTVOROV

Yurii A. Rastvorov was born on July 11, 1921, in Dmitrievsk, Russia. His father is a retired colonel in the Soviet army and his mother was a physician. He entered middle school in 1929 in Voronezh, finishing in 1939 in Moscow, at which time he was admitted to the Moscow Geodesy Institute. In 1936 he had joined the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization.

After two months at the Moscow Geodesy Institute Rastvorov was conscripted into the Red Army. After basic training with the First Proletarian Division in Moscow, he was sent to the Soviet Occupying Army in Latvia and Lithuania, returning to Moscow in September, 1940. He was selected as a student at the Military Faculty of the Far Eastern Language Institute, controlled by Red Army Military Intelligence, where he studied the English and Japanese languages. When war broke out in July, 1941, his training was changed to demolition work and paratroop training for guerrilla warfare, but because of his knowledge of Japanese he was sent to the military intelligence office at Chita and then to the Seventh Army area in Outer Mongolia to train in psychological warfare aimed at the Japanese. In Mongolia in 1942 he was commissioned a lieutenant in the military intelligence service.

After Japan entered the war, Rastvorov was reassigned to the Far Eastern Language Institute. In 1943 he was transferred from the military intelligence service to the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) in Moscow. In January, 1944, he was transferred to the Intelligence Directorate of NKGB and sent to the Caucasus on an assignment involving relocation of national minorities from Southern Russia to Siberia.

Rastvorov was assigned to the First Directorate of the NKGB in Moscow in April, 1944. He entered the First Directorate School for intelligence training in August, 1944. After graduation in June, 1945, he returned to the Japan Section, First Directorate, NKGB. He was promoted to captain, and in February, 1946, he arrived in Tokyo as an NKGB intelligence officer under the guise of a Foreign Office translator.

In December, 1946, Rastvorov was recalled to Moscow and charged with concealing certain derogatory family facts on his NKGB application. He spent three months in detention, but was acquitted and returned to his duties in the Japan Section of the First Directorate of the NKGB, which by then was known as the Ministry of State Security (MGB), in March, 1947.

Rastvorov joined the Communist Party in 1947. In January, 1948, he was assigned to a Japanese Prisoner of War Screening Group in

Khabarovsk, under MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) cover, to recruit agents from among Japanese prisoners of war held in Siberia. He returned to Moscow in August, 1948, and was promoted to major.

In July, 1950, Rastvorov was reassigned to Tokyo, arriving there under the cover of an employee of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. In March, 1953, the MGB was absorbed by the MVD and at the time of his defection on January 24, 1954, Rastvorov held the rank of lieutenant colonel of the MVD.

Rastvorov has stated that his grandfather was dispossessed of his land and died of starvation in the 1930 famine and that this had been his first source of dissatisfaction with Soviet affairs. For a long time he had been losing interest in intelligence work. He has stated that the news of Beria's arrest in July, 1953, had a profound effect on the MVD group in Tokyo and that it was at this time that he made up his mind to defect at the first suitable opportunity. He had been having difficulties with the Chief of Mission in Tokyo, who in December, 1953, requested Moscow to recall Rastvorov on the grounds of incompetence, lack of enthusiasm, and bad behavior. Rastvorov was reprimanded and told that he would be punished upon his return to Moscow.

In January, 1954, Rastvorov was recalled to Russia. In fear of his fate should he return, he resolved not to obey and contacted an American friend with whom, he says, he had previously discussed his frame of mind and general dissatisfaction with the Soviets. He states that it was through this friend that he was able to defect to American authorities.

ANATOLI I. SKOCHKOV

Anatoli I. Skochkov was born on February 24, 1928, in Moscow, Russia. His father, a former coal miner and noncommissioned officer in the Tsarist army, joined the Communist Party in 1917 and held responsible positions with several railroads in the USSR until his retirement in 1948. Skochkov has admitted that he enjoyed many comforts and advantages unknown to the vast majority of Soviet citizens. He joined the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization, in 1943 but was not a member of the Communist Party.

From 1935 to 1945 Skochkov attended schools in Leningrad, Tashkent, Bologoye, Kalinin and Moscow, the family moving frequently because of his father's employment. He entered the Juridical Faculty of the Institute of Foreign Trade in 1945, graduating in 1950 as a lawyer of foreign trade. In August, 1950, Skochkov began working for IranSovTrans, a Soviet foreign trade association. In December, 1950, he went to Germany as senior economist in the Planning Section of Deutsche-Russische Transport A. G. (Derutra). He was released from this position in August, 1951, and offered a legal position with the Soviet Control Commission in Berlin-Karlshorst. When he found that there was actually no legal work involved he returned to Moscow and endeavored to secure a legal position. In December, 1951, he obtained work in the Juridical

Section, Second Directorate (dealing with Austria), of the Chief Directorate of Soviet Property Abroad. In January, 1952, he left for Austria to work as legal advisor in the Juridical Section there. From June to September, 1952, he acted as chief of the Juridical Section of the Soviet Petroleum Directorate and in September, 1952, he was promoted to senior legal advisor of the Central Commercial Office of the Directorate of Soviet Property in Austria, holding this position until his defection on February 14, 1954.

Although Skochkov has stated that he had in the past thought vaguely about defecting, his actual defection was not premeditated but was the result of a drunken spree in Vienna. Skochkov could recall few details of the night he defected and knows only that he found himself in U. S. custody. He admitted that he would not have defected had he been sober, because of the consequences to his family, but accepted the fact that he could not now return and was prepared to make the best of it.

PETR S. DERJABIN

Petr S. Derjabin was born on February 13, 1919, in Siberia. By 1937 he had completed the first year of pedagogical school in Belski. In 1938 and 1939 he taught a course on the history of the constitution of the Soviet Union in a town near Belski. In October, 1939, he was drafted into the Red Army.

In 1944 Derjabin entered intelligence work specializing in counterintelligence, most of the time at headquarters in Moscow. In September, 1953, he became deputy chief of the Soviet Counterintelligence Group of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) in Vienna, under the cover position of deputy expediter for the Soviet High Commissioner of Austria. He held the rank of major in the MVD.

Derjabin has stated that he had thoughts of defection for at least two years before he finally acted and that lack of promotion, difficulties with his superiors, and marital trouble all entered into his decision to defect. He was dissatisfied with the political system in Russia and had a feeling of personal insecurity at seeing capable officers of long service released without justification. The most compelling reason for breaking with the Soviets when he did, however, was probably the defection on February 14, 1954, of Anatoli I. Skochkov, for Derjabin has stated that he would have been held responsible for Skochkov's defection.

As a young man Derjabin was a member of the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization. He later became a member of the Communist Party.

On February 15, 1954, Derjabin, in civilian clothes, entered a United States military police station in Vienna, identified himself as an MVD officer, and requested asylum.

VLADIMIR M. PETROV

Vladimir M. Petrov was born on February 15, 1907, in Larikha, Siberia. His father, a farmer, died in 1914. Petrov attended school from 1915 until the time of the revolution in 1917. From 1919 to 1927 he worked for a local blacksmith, in the meantime joining the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization, in 1923. In 1927 he became a member of the Communist Party and during 1928 and 1929 he attended a Party school for trade-union officials at Nizhny Tagil. In late 1929 he was sent as a minor trade-union official to a metallurgical works in Nadezhdinsk. In October, 1930, he was called up for service in the Red Navy and trained as a cipher specialist at a mine-laying school in Kronstadt. In mid-1931 Petrov was given the rank of junior petty officer and assigned to a ship on which he served until he left the navy in April, 1933.

In April, 1933, Petrov went to Moscow and on May 5, 1933, secured employment in the Cipher Section of the OGPU, later known as the NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs). From about September, 1937, to about February, 1938, Petrov was in charge of a cipher unit attached to the staff of an NKVD division in Western China. In February, 1938, he returned to Moscow and was assigned to the

Internal Cipher Communications Division of the NKVD, eventually becoming deputy section chief. In February, 1941, he transferred to the NKGB (People's Commissariat of State Security), which later became known as the MGB (Ministry of State Security). Petrov was already a major of State Security.

In March, 1943, Petrov arrived in Stockholm, Sweden, as a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy, this assignment being a cover for his activities as cipher clerk to the NKVD-NKGB chief resident in the Embassy and his responsibilities for security observation of personnel of all Soviet missions in Stockholm.

In October, 1947, Petrov was recalled to Moscow, promoted to lieutenant colonel of State Security, and assigned to work in the newly formed intelligence agency, the Committee of Information (KI). He served in the Maritime Section which was concerned with the loyalty, political reliability and correct conduct of Soviet merchant navy personnel in foreign waters. He continued in this work until he left for Australia in January, 1951, although his department was removed from the KI and placed back under MGB control in December, 1948.

Petrov arrived in Australia on February 5, 1951, as a secret representative of the First Directorate of MGB, charged with security and loyalty of personnel at the Soviet Embassy as well as

counterintelligence work among Russian emigres in Australia. As cover he was given the status of third secretary in the Embassy. In May, 1952, he became the temporary MGB chief resident for Australia and carried on this function until he defected on April 3, 1954. In 1952 he had been promoted to the rank of full colonel of State Security.

Petrov was recalled to Moscow on May 5, 1953, but he became ill and his return was postponed until July, 1953, and later cancelled altogether. He has stated that he first considered defection in 1952 when he began having personal difficulties with the ambassador and the commercial attache of the Embassy, who were submitting adverse reports on him to Moscow. In March, 1954, he received word that he was to be replaced and would leave for Moscow on May 8, 1954. Petrov believed that if he returned to Russia he would be sent to Siberia, executed, or demoted to a menial job. The Australian Security Intelligence Organization had had Petrov under observation for some time and made it easy for Petrov to contact a representative of that organization. This culminated in Petrov's breaking with the Soviets on April 3, 1954.

Petrov did not take his wife into his confidence concerning his plans to defect although he has stated that he had sounded her out on the matter some months before. She had been noncommittal and Petrov

felt that she would not join him in defecting because of her fears for her family in Moscow should she take such a step. It also must be remembered that Petrov's wife had been a Soviet intelligence employee ever since she first joined the OGPU as a cipher clerk in 1933 and in 1945 she held the rank of captain in the State Security service. This probably restrained Petrov from speaking too freely to his wife about his plans. Mrs. Petrov's defection apparently resulted directly from the harsh treatment she received at the hands of Soviet Embassy personnel after her husband had defected and the realization that, even though completely innocent, she would be severely punished upon her return to Moscow.

The story behind Petrov's defection illustrates the importance of presenting to a potential defector, at the psychologically opportune time, a clear opportunity to defect. It also demonstrates the patience and ingenuity required to develop a situation to the point where the psychologically correct moment can be recognized and acted upon.

Petrov arrived at the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, Australia, in February, 1951. In July, 1951, an informant of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization met Petrov at the Russian Social Club, a pro-Soviet organization in Sydney, Australia, and pursuant to instructions began cultivating the friendship of Petrov. During the next two years the relationship developed to the point where Petrov often visited the informant's apart-

ment when in Sydney, and on many occasions spent the night there with the informant. Through this source the Australian Security Intelligence Organization learned of Petrov's difficulties at the Soviet Embassy and of his impending recall to Russia.

When Petrov developed an eye affliction in April, 1953, the informant referred Petrov to an eye specialist in Sydney for treatment. Under the guidance of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization the eye specialist brought up the matter of future treatment in the event Petrov should return to Russia, and indicated that he could place Petrov in touch with the proper officials should Petrov desire to remain in Australia. This ultimately resulted in the first direct meeting between Petrov and a representative of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization on February 27, 1954, and led to Petrov's defection on April 3, 1954.

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