THIS IS A NAVAL AVIATION NEAR-MIDAIR COLLISION HAZARD REPORT  
AIRBORNE MINE COUNTERMEASURES WPN SYS TRG SCH, 01-05, 6 OCTOBER 2004, REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3750-20/

INVOLVED AIRCRAFT: 
HM-14, MH053E, 164861

MSGID/GENADMIN/

SUBJ/NAVAL AVIATION NMAC HAZREP/

REF/A/DOC/OPNAVINST 3750.6R/-/

AMPN/REF A IS THE NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM.

POC / LCDR/PH: EMAIL: 

RMKS/

1. THIS REPORT CONCERNS A ROUTINE HAZARD TO NAVAL AVIATION. RAC NOT YET SPECIFIED. 
FURTHER ENDORSEMENT NOT REQUIRED. 
SUMMARY: HELICOPTER PASSED WITHIN 100 FEET OF AN UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT.


3. CATEGORY: INTENT FOR FLIGHT DID EXIST

4. DATA:
   A. REPORTING ACTIVITY:
      (1) NAME: AIRBORNE MINE COUNTERMEASURES WPN SYS TRG SCH
      (2) UIC: N69022
      (3) LOCAL SERIAL: 01-05
      (4) REPORT SERIAL: 1122902848181
   B. AIRCRAFT:
      (1) AIRCRAFT #1
         (A) TMS: MH053E
         (B) BUNO: 164861
         (C) TAIL CODE AND SIDE NUMBER: BJ544
         (D) REPORTING CUST: HELO MINE COUNTERMEASURES SQUADRON 14
         (E) CONTROLLING CUST: COMNAVAIRLANT (CNAL)
         (F) IDTC CYCLE: N/A
         (G) MISSION: NIGHT FAM
         (H) TMR: 1A1
         (I) FLIGHT PLAN:
            (1) TYPE OF FLIGHT PLAN: VFR
            (2) MET CONDITIONS: VMC
            (3) DEST: NS NORFOLK
         (J) EVOLUTION:
            (1) HDG: 130
            (2) KIAS: 120
            (3) MSL: 350
            (4) AGL: 300
            (5) TERRAIN ELEVATION: 50.0
            (6) AIRWAY/OPERATING AREA: CLASS G/UNCONTROLLED
(K) PERSONNEL:

1) PERSON #1

CREWMEMBER'S IN FLIGHT DUTY:
PILOT
AIRCRAFT/HELO COMMANDER
INSTRUCTOR
(A) SVC: NAVY
(B) INJURIES: NO INJURY OR ILLNESS
(C) NVD: NO
(D) EXPERIENCE:
(1) TOTAL TIME:
(A) PILOT 1207.8
(2) MODEL TIME:
(A) PILOT 968.5
(3) QUALS:
HELO AIRCRAFT COMMANDER
(E) GENDER: MALE
(F) DUTY STATUS: ON DUTY

2) PERSON #2

CREWMEMBER'S IN FLIGHT DUTY:
PILOT
PILOT AT CONTROLS
STUDENT/UNDER INSTRUCTION
(A) SVC: NAVY
(B) INJURIES: NO INJURY OR ILLNESS
(C) NVD: NO
(D) EXPERIENCE:
(1) TOTAL TIME:
(A) PILOT 1665.2
(2) MODEL TIME:
(A) PILOT 783.9
(E) GENDER: MALE
(F) DUTY STATUS: ON DUTY

3) PERSON #3

CREWMEMBER'S IN FLIGHT DUTY:
CREW CHIEF
1ST CREW
OTHER
(A) SVC: NAVY
(B) INJURIES: NO INJURY OR ILLNESS
(C) NVD: NO

(D) EXPERIENCE:

(1) TOTAL TIME:
   (A) TSPECCRWTME 777.3

(2) MODEL TIME:
   (A) TSPECCRWTME 777.3

(E) GENDER: MALE

(F) DUTY STATUS: ON DUTY

(4) PERSON #4

CREWMEMBER'S IN FLIGHT DUTY:
STUDENT/UNDER INSTRUCTION

(A) SVC: NAVY

(B) INJURIES: NO INJURY OR ILLNESS

(C) NVD: NO

(D) EXPERIENCE:

(1) TOTAL TIME:
   (A) TSPECCRWTME 2718.5

(2) MODEL TIME:
   (A) TSPECCRWTME 777.3

(E) GENDER: MALE

(F) DUTY STATUS: ON DUTY

(5) PERSON #5

CREWMEMBER'S IN FLIGHT DUTY:
AERIAL OBSERVER

(A) SVC: NAVY

(B) INJURIES: NO INJURY OR ILLNESS

(C) NVD: NO

(D) EXPERIENCE:

(1) TOTAL TIME:
   (A) TSPECCRWTME 64.9

(2) MODEL TIME:
   (A) TSPECCRWTME 64.9

(E) GENDER: MALE

(F) DUTY STATUS: ON DUTY

(L) LIGHTING:

(1) LANDING LIGHT: NO

(2) EXTERNAL LIGHTS: NO

C. GENERAL INFORMATION:

(1) DATE: 6 OCTOBER 2004

(2) TIME: 1935
(3) ZONE:  R
(4) CONDN:  NIGHT
(5) MATERIAL DAMAGE COST:  0
(6) LOCATION:
   (A) STATE: VA
   (B) COUNTRY: UNITED STATES
   (C) NAVAID:   KNGU
   (D) BRG:  280
   (E) DIST:  6
   (F) AIRSPACE: CLASS G/UNCONTROLLED
(7) INVOLVED SHIP:
(8) RUNWAYS:

5. INVOLVED FACTORS
   A. FACTOR #1
      (1) TYPE: HUMAN: AIRCREW
      (2) STATEMENT: PAC FAILED TO MAINTAIN TRACK OF OUTSIDE TRAFFIC AT NIGHT
      (3) REMARKS: PAC ALLOWED HIS ATTENTION TO BE DIVERTED INSIDE THE COCKPIT BY AN INSTRUMENTATION ERROR WHILE CROSSING OUT OF CONTROLLED AIRSPACE AT NIGHT AT LESS THAN 500 FEET AND 150 KNOTS.
      (4) RAC:  3 - MODERATE RISK
         (A) SEVERITY: II - MAY CAUSE SEVERE INJURY, ILLNESS, PROPERTY DAMAGE
         (B) PROBABILITY: C - MAY OCCUR IN TIME
      (5) HUMAN FACTORS
         (A) WHO: AIRCREW/PAX: PILOT AT CONTROLS: UNDER INSTRUCTION
         (B) WHAT: AIRCREW: MISJUDGE DISTANCE/ALTITUDE/POSITION; RESULT IMPACT AIRCRAFT/OBJECT: MISJUDGED CLOSURE RATE/RATE OF DESCENT
         (C) WHY
            (1) REASON #1 PERFORMANCE: FAILURE OF ATTENTION: DISTRACTION INTERNAL
            (2) REASON #2 ENVIRONMENT: EXTERNAL TO AIRCRAFT: OBSCURED VISION/HORIZON
   B. FACTOR #2
      (1) TYPE: HUMAN: AIRCREW
      (2) STATEMENT: PNAC FAILED TO REALIZE THE DEGREE TO WHICH AIRCRAFT TWO WAS A FACTOR.
      (3) REMARKS: PNAC ACKNOWLEDGED THE CONFLICTING TRAFFIC BUT WAS NOT ABLE TO DISCERN THE PROXIMITY OF THE OTHER AIRCRAFT.
(4) **RAC:** 3 - MODERATE RISK  
(A) **SEVERITY:** II - MAY CAUSE SEVERE INJURY, ILLNESS, PROPERTY DAMAGE  
(B) **PROBABILITY:** C - MAY OCCUR IN TIME

(5) **HUMAN FACTORS**  
(A) **WHO:** AIRCREW/PAX : PILOT NOT AT CONTROLS : INSTRUCTOR  
(B) **WHAT:** AIRCREW : MISJUDGE DISTANCE/ALTITUDE/POSITION; RESULT IMPACT AIRCRAFT/OBJECT : MISJUDGED CLOSURE RATE/RATE OF DESCENT  
(C) **WHY**  
(1) **REASON #1** ENVIRONMENT : EXTERNAL TO AIRCRAFT : OBSCURED VISION/HORIZON

C. FACTOR #3  
(1) **TYPE:** HUMAN: SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL  
(2) **STATEMENT:** AIR DET OIC DID NOT IDENTIFY THE NEED TO PROVIDE HELO SPECIFIC ROUTES  
(3) **REMARKS:** DURING DAY VFR THIS IS GENERALLY NOT A PROBLEM. BUT AS WEATHER DEGRADES, OR VISIBILITY DECREASES DUE TONIGHT OR IMC, AND HELICOPTER TRAFFIC INCREASES, DISCERNING COURSE AND LOCATION OF OTHER TRAFFIC BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC INGRESS/EGRESS ROUTES WOULD NOT ONLY SEPARATE NAVY AIRCRAFT OPERATING OUT OF CHAMBERS FIELD, BUT COULD ALSO ALERT CIVILIAN AND COAST GUARD AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN THE AREA IF REFERENCED IN NOTAMS OR THE AP/1.

(4) **RAC:** 3 - MODERATE RISK  
(A) **SEVERITY:** II - MAY CAUSE SEVERE INJURY, ILLNESS, PROPERTY DAMAGE  
(B) **PROBABILITY:** C - MAY OCCUR IN TIME

(5) **APPLIES TO AIRCRAFT:** TMS: MH053E, BUNO: 164861

(6) **HUMAN FACTORS**  
(A) **WHO:** SUPERVISORY : SQUADRON/STATION : DETACHMENT OFFICER IN CHARGE  
(B) **WHAT:** SUPERVISORY : FAILURE TO PROVIDE/PROVIDED INADEQUATE/IMPROPER : HAZARD ASSESSMENT  
(C) **WHY**  
(1) **REASON #1** PERFORMANCE : DECISION ERROR : FAILURE TO CONSIDER OR EMPLOY AVAILABLE/ADEQUATE RISK CONTROLS

6. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

A. **RECOMMENDATION #1**  
(1) **DESCRIPTION:** DEVELOP COURSE RULES FOR THE TRANSIT OF HELICOPTERS FROM CHAMBERS FIELD TO LOCAL AIRFIELDS PROVIDING HORIZONTAL...
SEPARATION. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE ADDED TO A NOTAM AND THE APPLICABLE SECTION OF AP/1.

(2) ACTION AGENCY: NAVAL AIR STATION OCEANA AIR DET NORFOLK

(3) APPLIES TO:

(1) TYPE: HUMAN: SUPERVISORY PERSONEL
(2) STATEMENT: AIR DET OIC DID NOT IDENTIFY THE NEED TO PROVIDE HELO SPECIFIC ROUTES

(4) STATUS: COMPLETED

B. RECOMMENDATION #2

(1) DESCRIPTION: BRIEF THIS HAZREP TO ALL AIRCREWS.

(2) ACTION AGENCY: ROTARY

(3) APPLIES TO:

(1) TYPE: HUMAN: AIRCREW
(2) STATEMENT: PAC FAILED TO MAINTAIN TRACK OF OUTSIDE TRAFFIC AT NIGHT

(1) TYPE: HUMAN: AIRCREW
(2) STATEMENT: PNAC FAILED TO REALIZE THE DEGREE TO WHICH AIRCRAFT TWO WAS A FACTOR.

(4) STATUS: COMPLETED

7. COMMANDERS COMMENTS: THIS HAZREP DETAILS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SEE AND AVOID. IT IS EASY TO GET CAUGHT IN THE TRAP WHERE ONE CREWMEMBER CALLS TRAFFIC AND ALL OTHER CREWMEMBERS ASSUME THAT SOMEONE ELSE IS WATCHING. SEE AND AVOID IN A MULTI-CREW AIRCRAFT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL CREWMEMBERS NOT JUST THE INDIVIDUAL INITIALLY SIGHTING THE TRAFFIC. THIS DISCIPLINE MUST BE BRIEFED AND RE-BRIEFED. THAT PART IS CLEAR. END OF STORY. WE ALSO OWE OUR CREWSTHE ABILITY TO HAVE AN ADVANTAGE. THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED JUST OUTSIDE CLASS D AIRSPACE IN THE VICINITY OF A HELICOPTER CHECKPOINT AT NIGHT. HELICOPTERS ROUTINELY HIT THIS CHECKPOINT IN ROUTETO/RETURNING FROM OUTLYING FIELDS.ALTHOUGH SEE AND AVOID WILL ALWAYS APPLY, A REVISION OF HELICOPTER COURSE RULES THAT STANDARDIZES VFR ROUTING TO OLFS (SUCH AS STAY TO THE WESTERN EDGE OF THE JAMES RIVER WHEN FLYING NORTHBOUND TO FELKER) WOULD BE BENEFICIAL. THIS WOULD NOT ONLY ADD A SAFETY MARGIN TO OUR OWN AIRCRAFT, BUT COULD ALSO ALERT NON-LOCAL/CIVIL AIRCRAFT VIA A NOTAM AND/OR AN AP/1 NOTE ABOUT THE EXTENSIVE HELICOPTER TRAFFIC IN THE AREA AND THEIR ROUTING. WITH PLANS TO BRING MORE HELICOPTER SQUADRONS TO NORFOLK, THIS PROBLEM WILL ONLY BECOME WORSE. ANOTHER MULTIPLIER IN THIS REGIME WOULD BE THE USE OF NVDS IN THE MH-53E. ONCE AGAIN, NVDS WILL NEVER TAKE THE PLACE OF SEE AND AVOID, BUT IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE TO PREDICT THAT HAD THE CREW BEEN AIDED THEY MAY HAVE ACQUIRED THIS TRAFFIC PRIOR TO GETTING IN EXTREMIS. ULTIMATELY, THE AIRCREW
OPERATING VFR IS RESPONSIBLE TO SEE AND AVOID OTHER TRAFFIC, INJECTING THE ORM PROCESS MAKES IT IMPERATIVETHAT WE PROVIDE THEM WITH EVERY ENABLER IN THIS EFFORT.

8. QA ONLY
   A. AIRCRAFT
      (1) AIRCRAFT #1
         (A) TMS: MH053E
         (B) BUNO: 164861
         (C) INCIDENT TYPE: NEAR MIDAIR/NEAR MISS BETWEEN AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT AND AIRCRAFT ON GROUND
         (D) PHASE OP: LANDING PATTERN

END OF REPORT