

TO: AA-TESTERS

~~UNCLAS FOUO~~/N03750//

THIS IS A NAVAL AVIATION GENERAL USE HAZARD REPORT PATROL SQUADRON 47,
02-05, 12 DECEMBER 2004, REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3750-20//

INVOLVED AIRCRAFT:
VP-47, P003C, 158927

MSGID/GENADMIN//

SUBJ/NAVAL AVIATION GENUSE HAZREP//

REF/A/DOC/OPNAVINST 3750.6R/-//

AMPN/REF A IS THE NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM.

POC [(b)(6)] / LT/PH: [(b)(6)] EMAIL: [(b)(6)] /

RMKS/

1. THIS REPORT CONCERNS A ROUTINE HAZARD TO NAVAL AVIATION. RAC 3.
FURTHER ENDORSEMENT NOT REQUIRED.

SUMMARY: INCURSION ON USS NIMITZ MARSHALLING AIRSPACE

2. NARRATIVE: SUMMARY: INCURSION ON USS NIMITZ MARSHALLING AIRSPACE
DURING
SUPPORT OF COMPTUEX.

2. NARRATIVE: CREW ARRIVED FOR MISSION PLANNING AT NAS NORTH
ISLAND (NASNI) TSC ONE HOUR PRIOR TO SCHEDULED BRIEF TIME. TACCO
AND NAV/COMM SPENT A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF MISSION PREPARATION TIME
LOADING DATA LINK CRYPTO FROM TSC VAULT. TSC PERSONNEL STATED THAT
USS NIMITZ WAS WELL SOUTH (APPROX 40 NM) AND HAD REMAINED THERE
THROUGHOUT MOST OF EXERCISE. ALL AIRCREW POSITIONS WERE UNPREPARED
FOR CREW TACTICAL BRIEF RESULTING IN A HURRIED PREFLIGHT. NOTED
EQUIPMENT DISCREPANCIES DURING PREFLIGHT WERE INOPERATIVE ESM, MAD,
SIF VIDEO, AND INTERMITTENT ONLINE RADAR. ENROUTE, FLIGHT STATION
CHECKED IN WITH FASFAC PRIOR TO PROCEEDING TO OPAREA. AFTER
CHECKING IN WITH REDCROWN, FLIGHT STATION CYCLED THROUGH BRIEFED
TACAN CHANNELS ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE BATTLE GROUP SURFACE UNITS. ALL
BRIEFED TACAN CHANNELS WORKED WITH EXCEPTION OF THREE, INCLUDING USS

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Ref: SECNAVINST 5720.42, OPNAVINST 3750.6R and OPNAVINST 5102.1D/MCO P5102.1B

NIMITZ. GREEN COMMS WITH NZ/ACU WERE INTERMITTENT (RECURRING PROBLEM WITH NIMCSG NZ MOD) AND JOIN WAS EVENTUALLY PASSED IN RED. AFTER RECEIVING HOT TURNOVER FROM OFF GOING P-3, CREW BEGAN PASSIVELY TRACKING TOI. USS NIMITZ WAS NOT ACTIVE IN DATA LINK. APPROXIMATELY 1.5 HOURS PRIOR TO OFF STATION, ACU PASSED AIRCRAFT WAS CLOSING TO WITHIN TEN MILES OF USS NIMITZ USING NIMITZ TACTICAL CALL SIGN. NAV/COMM RECEIVED AND LOGGED CALL BUT DID NOT RECOGNIZE TACTICAL (JANAP) CALLSIGN AS THAT OF USS NIMITZ. NEITHER TACCO OR FLIGHT STATION HEARD RADIO CALL. AT APPROXIMATELY SAME TIME, CREW WENT LOST CONTACT ON TARGET AND FOCUSED ON DEPLOYMENT OF LOST CONTACT PATTERN IN ORDER TO REGAIN TOI CONTACT. ACU MADE NO FURTHER CALLS TO AIRCRAFT REGARDING POSITION OF NIMITZ. AIRCRAFT CHECKED OFF STATION AT BRIEFED TIME AND PROCEEDED EAST TO STAY CLEAR OF SURFACE TRAFFIC AND ACTIVE OPAREA. FLIGHT STATION CHECKED IN WITH FASFAC AND WAS CLEARED DIRECT SKATE AT 5000'. WEATHER CONDITIONS WERE VMC. NO CONFLICTING AIR TRAFFIC WAS NOTED. MPA SOF WAS TUNED INTO VHF RADIO. ALL RADIOS WERE IN TR+G MODE THROUGHOUT THE FLIGHT. NO GUARD CALLS WERE HEARD. AT MISSION DEBRIEF, CREW WAS INFORMED THAT AIRCRAFT HAD VIOLATED MARSHALL RADIAL 15 MINUTES AFTER CHECKING OFF STATION. SOURCE OF INFORMATION WAS SIPRNET CHAT SENT FROM NIMITZ TO TSC NASNI.

3. CATEGORY: INTENT FOR FLIGHT DID EXIST

4. DATA:

A. REPORTING ACTIVITY:

- (1) NAME: PATROL SQUADRON 47
- (2) UIC: N09600
- (3) LOCAL SERIAL: 02-05
- (4) REPORT SERIAL: 1219405517010

B. AIRCRAFT:

- (1) AIRCRAFT #1
 - (A) TMS: P003C
 - (B) BUNO: 158927
 - (C) TAIL CODE AND SIDE NUMBER: RD927
 - (D) REPORTING CUST: PATROL SQUADRON 47
 - (E) CONTROLLING CUST: PENDING
 - (F) IDTC CYCLE: N/A
 - (G) MISSION: ASW

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(H) TMR: 2Q2

(I) FLIGHT PLAN:

(1) TYPE OF FLIGHT PLAN: IFR

(2) MET CONDITIONS: VMC

(3) DEST: UNK

(J) EVOLUTION:

(1) AIRWAY/OPERATING AREA: N/A

(K) PERSONNEL:

(1) PERSON #1

CREWMEMBER'S IN FLIGHT DUTY:

PILOT AT CONTROLS

(A) SVC: NAVY

(B) INJURIES: NO INJURY OR ILLNESS

(C) NVD: NO

(D) EXPERIENCE:

(1) TOTAL TIME:

(A) PILOT 422.1

(2) MODEL TIME:

(A) PILOT 247.5

(3) QUALS:

OTHER: PPP

(E) GENDER: MALE

(F) DUTY STATUS: ON DUTY

(2) PERSON #2

CREWMEMBER'S IN FLIGHT DUTY:

PILOT NOT AT CONTROLS

(A) SVC: NAVY

(B) INJURIES: NO INJURY OR ILLNESS

(C) NVD: NO

(D) EXPERIENCE:

(1) TOTAL TIME:

(A) PILOT 2313.8

(2) MODEL TIME:

(A) PILOT 2110.7

(3) QUALS:

OTHER: PPC/MC/IP/FCF

(E) GENDER: MALE

(F) DUTY STATUS: ON DUTY

(L) LIGHTING:

(1) LANDING LIGHT: UNK

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(2) EXTERNAL LIGHTS: UNK

C. GENERAL INFORMATION:

- (1) DATE: 12 DECEMBER 2004
- (2) TIME: 2015
- (3) ZONE: U
- (4) CONDN: NIGHT
- (5) OPERATION: NONE
- (6) MATERIAL DAMAGE COST: 000.00
- (7) LOCATION:
 - (A) LATD: 00:00:00N
 - (B) LONG: 000:00:00E
 - (C) STATE: CA
 - (D) COUNTRY: UNITED STATES
 - (E) AIRSPACE: N/A
- (8) INVOLVED SHIP:
 - (A) SHIP #1
 - (1) EVENT LOCN: YES
 - (2) POSITIVE CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT: YES
 - (3) DAMAGED: NO
 - (4) PERSONS ABOARD INJURED: NO
 - (5) FOREIGN/COMMERCIAL VESSEL: USS NIMITZ
- (9) RUNWAYS:

5. INVOLVED FACTORS

A. FACTOR #1

- (1) TYPE: OTHER: SPECIAL TYPE
- (2) STATEMENT: BEFORE FLIGHT TSC WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE
- (3) REMARKS: - EVIDENCE: BEFORE FLIGHT TSC WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE JOTS PLOT ON REQUEST DUE TO OTCIXS EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS AND DID NOT PROVIDE CURRENT CV COMM CARD OF THE DAY WHICH HAD CORRECT TACAN CHANNELS. DURING FLIGHT ESM AND SIF VIDEO WERE INOPERATIVE AND RADAR WAS INTERMITTENT. AFTER FLIGHT DURING VERBAL DEBRIEF TSC PERSONNEL INDICATED PENETRATION THROUGH MARSHALLING AIRSPACE BASED ON SIPRNET CHAT RECEIVED SHORTLY AFTER THE TIME OF INCIDENT. REVIEW OF NAVCOMM LOGS INDICATED THAT APPROX 1 HOUR BEFORE CHECKING OFFSTA, ACU PASSED RELATIVE BEARING AND RANGE TO USS NIMITZ VIA PLAIN VOICE USING JANAP CALLSIGN, BUT NAVCOM DID NOT PASS THIS TO REST OF AIRCREW.
 - ANALYSIS: THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT A NUMBER OF FACTORS OCCURRED

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THAT CAUSED A BREAKDOWN IN CRM WHICH ULTIMATELY LED TO THE AIRCREW'S INCURSION INTO USS NIMITZ MARSHALLING AIRSPACE. OTCIXS WAS INOPERATIVE WHICH PREVENTED TSC FROM PROVIDING SURFACE PLOT FOR INITIAL ONSTA SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. ESM AND SIF VIDEO WAS INOPERATIVE. IN ADDITION, RADAR WAS INTERMITTENT WHICH DEGRADED THE AIRCREW'S SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REGARDING AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT. INCORRECTLY BRIEFED TACAN CHANNELS ALSO DEGRADED AIRCREW SITUATIONAL AWARENESS REGARDING AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT. LACK OF ASSERTIVENESS AND UNFAMILIARITY WITH TERMINOLOGY DUE TO INEXPERIENCE PREVENTED THE NAVCOMM FROM PASSING PERTINENT MESSAGES TO REST OF AIRCREW. FINALLY, GENERAL LACK OF ASSERTIVENESS AMONG THE AIRCREW PREVENTED FOLLOW-UP WITH ACU OR REDCROWN REGARDING LOCATION OF USS NIMITZ VIA MULTIPLE COMM CIRCUITS THAT COULD HAVE RESOLVED THE LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.

- AIRCREW FACTOR - AIRCREW FAILED TO ENSURE CARRIER POSITION BECAUSE OF LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND INADEQUATE ASSERTIVENESS DUE TO DEGRADED/INOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT.

WHO: AIRCREW, OTHER, NO FUTURE BREAKDOWN;

WHAT: AIRCREW, FAILURE OF AIRCREW COORDINATION, FAILED TO COORDINATE ACTIONS;

WHY: COORDINATION, INADEQUATE COORDINATION, BREAKDOWN OF CRM.

- AIRCREW FACTOR - NAVCOMM FAILED TO PASS PERTINENT INFORMATION TO AIRCREW BECAUSE OF LACK OF ASSERTIVENESS AND EXPERIENCE.

WHO: AIRCREW, NAVIGATOR, NO FURTHER BREAKDOWN;

WHAT: AIRCREW, FAILURE OF AIRCREW COORDINATION, FAILED TO COMMUNICATE;

WHY: COMMUNICATION, MISINTERPRETATION - VERBAL, MESSAGE RECEIVED BUT MISUNDERSTOOD.

7. CONCLUSIONS: MULTIPLE HUMAN AND COMPONENT FAILURES CAN ACCUMULATE TO OBSCURE THE LOCATION AND INTENTIONS OF EVEN THE MOST SIGNIFICANT UNITS, AIRSPACE, AND HAZARDS TO NAVIGATION.

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- (4) **RAC: 3 - MODERATE RISK**
(A) **SEVERITY: II - MAY CAUSE SEVERE INJURY, ILLNESS, PROPERTY DAMAGE**
(B) **PROBABILITY: C - MAY OCCUR IN TIME**

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. RECOMMENDATION #1

(1) **DESCRIPTION: A. FOR VP-47:**

(1) **BRIEF THIS HAZREP TO ALL AIRCREW. ACTION COMPLETE.**

B. FOR ALL ORION ACTIVITIES:

(1) **BRIEF THIS HAZREP TO ALL AIRCREW.**

C. FOR TSC NORTH ISLAND:

(1) **REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR COMPILING BRIEFING BOOKS FOR EXERCISE AIRCREWS TO ENSURE INCLUSION OF COMM CARD OF THAT DAY AND LOCATION OF BLUE FORCES.**

(2) **ACTION AGENCY: PATROL SQUADRON 47 - VP-47**

(3) **APPLIES TO:**

(1) **TYPE: OTHER: SPECIAL TYPE**

(2) **STATEMENT: BEFORE FLIGHT TSC WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE**

(4) **SUMMARY NARRATIVE NONE**

7. COMMANDERS COMMENTS: THIS INCIDENT IS A CLASSIC DEMONSTRATION OF WHY CRM PRINCIPLES -- PARTICULARLY COMMUNICATION AND ASSERTIVENESS -- ARE CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF A FLIGHT. WHILE WE DEPEND ON OUR EQUIPMENT TO ENHANCE OUR TACTICAL PICTURE, IT IS ULTIMATELY THE AIRCREW'S RESPONSIBILITY TO USE THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO KEEP THEM SAFE AND MISSION EFFECTIVE. PARTS OF THESE RESOURCES INCLUDE REVIEWING ALL APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO AN EXERCISE AND ASKING PERTINENT QUESTIONS DURING MISSION BRIEFS. IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE AWARENESS OF TACTICAL PICTURE. IN THIS CASE, A SIMPLE RADIO CALL OR AN ASSERTIVE QUERY OVER ICS COULD HAVE RESOLVED THE AIRSPACE AMBIGUITY BUT A COMBINATION OF INEXPERIENCE, COMPLACENCY, AND TASK-SATURATION IN THE COORD OPS ENVIRONMENT, EXPOSED THE CREW AND AIRCRAFT TO A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. WHILE THIS IS NOT THE FIRST INSTANCE OF INADVERTENT CARRIER AIRSPACE PENETRATION BY A P-3, WE MUST CONTINUE TO IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE CARRIER STRIKE GROUP. THANKFULLY THIS CREW LEARNED THAT LESSON WITHOUT PAYING A MUCH HIGHER PRICE.//

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8. QA ONLY

A. AIRCRAFT

(1) AIRCRAFT #1

(A) TMS: P003C

(B) BUNO: 158927

(C) INCIDENT TYPE: OTHER

(D) PHASE OP: LANDING PATTERN

END OF REPORT

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